Air Force Institute of Technology

AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations

Student Graduate Works

3-1999

A Validation Assessment of THUNDER 6.5's Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Module
Francine N. Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Operational Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Nelson, Francine N., "A Validation Assessment of THUNDER 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance Module" (1999). Theses and Dissertations. 5306.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/5306

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more
information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.

AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-13

A VALIDATION ASSESSMENT OF THUNDER 6.5'S
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND
RECONNAISSANCE MODULE
THESIS
Francine N. Nelson, Captain, USAF
AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-13

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

QUALITY INSPECTED Z

19990409 032

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-13

A VALIDATION ASSESSMENT OF THUNDER 6.5'S INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE MODULE

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Engineering
of the Air Force Institute of Technology
Air University
Air Education and Training Command
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Science in Operations Research

Francine N. Nelson, B A.
Captain, USAF
March 1998

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

AFIT/GOR/ENS/99M-13

A VALIDATION ASSESSMENT OF THUNDER 6.5'S INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE MODULE

Francine N. Nelson, B A.
Captain, USAF

Approved:

Gregg^A.4lcIntyre, Lt Col, USAF
Advisor

Date

Raymond R. Hill, Major, US;AF
Reader

Date

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my advisor, Lt Col Mclntyre,
for his outstanding support and assistance during this thesis effort. His willingness to
make time to answer my questions and to demonstrate ways to facilitate my work was
invaluable. Being a THUNDER novice, I relied heavily upon his teaching and guidance,
which he faithfully provided. I also appreciated his humor and innovative methods that
actually made this thesis process enjoyable. So, to you sir, I give a +5.
I would also like to thank my reader, Maj Hill, for his input and thoroughness in
reviewing my document. Even with a demanding schedule, he read my work with great
detail and with great promptness, resulting in increased clarity and quality of my analysis.
I appreciated his humor and witticism as he often provided a source of entertainment.
Thank you to the personnel at the Space Warfare Center for sponsoring this
research and funding my TDY excursions. Also, I am indebted to numerous individuals
outside of AFIT for their help and cooperation. If it weren't for those individuals at
AFSAA, S3I, NAIC, and ASC/XP, I would have never finished this work.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and prayers
over these past few months, and I would also like to thank God for answering those
prayers. I am sure that everyone is glad that my thesis will no longer be a required topic
of conversation.
Please accept my heartfelt thanks.
Fran

u

Table of Contents

u

Acknowledgements
List of Figures

vu

List of Tables

ix

Abstract

x

1. Introduction
1.1 Combat Modeling Tools
1.2 Problem Statement
1.3 Validation of Models
1.4 Modeling and Validating Intelligence
1.5 Thesis Outline

*■
1

2. THUNDER Overview

9

4
4

6
7

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Model Functional Design
2.3 Users
2.4 Assumptions
2.5 Origin and History
2.6 Current Verification and Validation Efforts
2.7 Summary

9

9

12

*2
13

15
16

3. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Overview

17

3.1 Introduction
3.2 Definitions
3.2.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
3.3 Intelligence Purposes
3.4 ISR Principles
3.5 Intelligence Support
3.6 Types of Intelligence
3.7 Intelligence Community
3.8 Communications for ISR Operations
3.8.1 Communication Satellites
3.8.1.1 Defense Satellite Communications System
3.8.1.2 Milstar
3.8.1.3 NATO Satellite System
3.8.1.4 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
3.8.1.5 UHF Follow-On Program
3.8.1.6 International Maritime Satellite System

1'

in

17

17
18
20
22
23
27

27
28

28
29
29

30
30

30

3.8.1.7 International Telecommunications Satellite
3.8.2 C4 Architectures
3.8.2.1 Defense Information System Network
3.8.2.2 Global Command and Control System
3.8.2.3 Global Broadcast Service
4. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Process during Theater-level
Conflict
4.1 Process Overview
4.1.1 User Requirement
4.1.2 Planning
4.1.3 Tasking
4.1.4 Collection
4.1.4.1 Airborne systems
4.1.4.1.1 Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles
4.1.4.1.2 RC-135
4.1.4.1.3 E-8CJ-STARS
4.1.4.1.4 U-2
4.1.4.1.5 EH-60L Quick Fix
4.1.4.1.6 E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning & Control System
4.1.4.1.7 RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor
4.1.4.2 Space-based Systems
4.1.4.2.1 Defense Support Program
4.1.4.2.2 SPOT Satellite System
4.1.4.3 Ground-based systems
4.1.4.3.1 Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Automated Tool Set
4.1.4.3.2 Ground Based Common Sensor
4.1.4.4 Sea-based systems
4.1.5 Analyze
4.1.5.1 Processing and analysis systems
4.1.5.1.1 Joint Service Imagery Processing System
4.1.5.1.2 Enemy Situation Correlation Element
4.1.5.1.3 Sentinel Byte
4.1.5.1.4 Constant Source
4.1.6 Dissemination
4.1.6.1 Department of Defense Intelligence Information System
4.1.6.2 Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
4.1.6.3 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
4.1.6.4 Open Source Information System
4.1.6.5 INTELINK
4.1.7 Evaluate
4.1.8 Apply
4.2 Summary

IV

31
31
31
31
32
33
33
34
36
40
42
43
43
44
45
46
46
47
48
48
49
49
50
50
51
51
52
54
54
54
55
55
55
57
57
58
58
59
59
60

61

5. THUNDER Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Methodology
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Levels of ISR
5.3 ISR Sensors/Platforms
5.4 Target Classes
5.5 Intelligence Collection
5.6 ISR Nodes
5.7 Target Perceptions
5.8 ISR Effects on Mission Planning and Mission Effectiveness
5.9 Effects on Ground War
5.10 Summary
6. Analysis of the THUNDER ISR Module
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Implementation of ISR Purposes
6.3 Representation of ISR Principles
6.4 Types of Intelligence
6.5 Communications
6.6 Initial Preparation of the Battlefield
6.7 ISR Process
6.7.1 User Requirement
6.7.2 Planning and Tasking
6.7.3 Collection
6.7.4 Analyze
6.7.5 Dissemination
6.7.6 Evaluate
6.7.7 Apply
6.8 Summary
7. Sensitivity Analysis of THUNDER ISR Module
7.1 Purpose
7.2 Scenario
7.3 Design of Experiment
7.4 Parameters
7.5 Measures of Outcome/Measures of Effectiveness
7.6 Statistical Analysis Methods
7.6.1 Least Squares Linear Regression
7.6.2 Testing for Significance of Individual Regression Coefficients
7.6.3 Testing for Significance of Regression
7.6.4 Testing for Significant Differences in Mean/Median Response
7.7 Results
7.7.1 Total Red Equipment Killed
7.7.1.1 Screening Experiment
7.7.1.2 Model
7.7.1.3 Response Surface

62
62
62
64
66
69
70
72
74
75
79
80
80
81
87
89
89
90
91
91
92
97
98
99
99
99
99
103
103
103
105
107
110
110
110
Ill
112
114
116
118
118
119
120

7.7.1.4 Significant Differences
7.7.2 Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
7.7.2.1 Screening Experiment
7.7.2.2 Model
7.7.2.3 Response Surface
7.7.2.4 Significant Differences
7.7.3 Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
7.7.3.1 Screening Experiment
7.7.3.2 Model
7.7.3.3 Response Surface
7.7.3.4 Significant Differences
7.7.4 Air Loss Exchange Ratio
7.7.4.1 Screening Experiment
7.7.4.2 Model
7.7.4.3 Response Surface
7.7.4.4 Significant Differences
7.7.5 Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
7.7.5.1 Screening Experiment
7.7.5.2 Model
7.7.5.3 Response Surface
7.7.5.4 Significant Differences
7.8 Summary and Conclusion

121
122
122
123

•

124
125
125
125
126
127
128
129
129
I30
131
131
133
133
I34
135
135
137

8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 Validation Assessment of THUNDER'sISR Module
8.2 Recommendations
8.3 Final Thought

139
139
I40

Bibliography

142

Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms

I46

Appendix B: Confidence Interval Summaries
90% Confidence Intervals for Total Red Equipment Killed
90% Confidence Intervals for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
90% Confidence Intervals for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
90% Confidence Intervals for Air Loss Exchange Ratio
90% Confidence Intervals for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed

150
150
152
154
156
158

Vita

160

VI

141

List of Figures

Figure 1. Air Force Analytical Toolkit Example
Figure 2. Comparison of Model Resolutions
Figure 3. Battlefield Grid
Figure 4. Battlefield Sectors and Zones
Figure 5. Confidence Levels of Intelligence Estimates
Figure 6. Intelligence Support at all Levels of War
Figure 7. Intelligence Community Membership
Figure 8. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process
Figure 9. Collection Planning Factors
Figure 10. Predator Medium Altitude Endurance UAV
Figure 11. RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT
Figure 12. E-8C J-STARS
•
Figure 13. U-2
Figure 14. EH-60L Quickfix
Figure 15. E-3 Sentry
Figure 16. RC-12Q GUARDRAIL COMMON SENSOR
Figure 17. CHATS
Figure 18. GBCS-H
Figure 19. THUNDER ISR Platforms
Figure 20. Impact of ISR Sensor Target Location Error on Target Acquisition
Figure 21. THUNDER ISR Target Prioritization
Figure 22. Intelligence Collection
Figure 23. ISR Processing Rules Example
Figure 24. ISR Observation Processing
Figure 25. Attrition Calculation Process
Figure 26. Computing Losses to Targets of Direct Fire Weapons
Figure 27. Comparison of ISR Purposes
Figure 28. User Requirement Representations
Figure 29. Planning and Tasking Intelligence Collection in THUNDER
Figure 30. ISR Planning in Theater Level Conflict
Figure 31. Face-centered Central Composite Design
Figure 32. Processing Time Parameters Impact on Air Planning Cycle
Figure 33. Total Red Equipment Killed Prediction Profile
Figure 34. Response Surfaces for Total Red Equipment Killed Model
Figure 35. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Prediction Profile
Figure 36. Response Surfaces for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Model
Figure 37. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Prediction Profile
Figure 38. Response Surfaces for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Figure 39. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Prediction Profile
Figure 40. Response Surfaces for Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model

vn

1
2
10
10

21
24
27
34
39

43
44

f
f

46
47

48
50
51
66

67
69
71
71
73
76
7

8

82

92
93
94
105
109
118
120
122
124
126
128
130
132

Figure 41. Percentage of Strategic Targets Killed Prediction Profile
134
Figure 42. Response Surfaces for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Model.. 136

vm

List of Tables

Table 1. THUNDER Release Chronology
Table 2. Types of Intelligence
Table 3. Requirement Satisfaction
Table 4. Example of "Fusing" Sensor Reports
Table 5. ISR Principles
Table 6. Changes to ME database
Table 7. Parameter Settings for each Factor Level
Table 8. Design Matrix and Mean Responses for each MOO/MOE
Table 9. Screening Fit for Total Red Equipment Killed
Table 10. Total Red Equipment Killed Model Parameter Estimates
Table 11. Total Red Equipment Model Summary of Fit
Table 12. Total Red Equipment Killed Analysis of Variance
Table 13. Significant Differences in Total Red Equipment Killed
Table 14. Screening Fit for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
Table 15. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Parameter Estimates
Table 16. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Model Summary of Fit
Table 17. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Analysis of Variance
Table 18. Significant Differences in Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
Table 19. Screening Fit for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Table 20. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Parameter Estimates
Table 21. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Model Summary of Fit
Table 22. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Analysis of Variance
Table 23. Significant Differences in Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Table 24. Screening Fit for Air Loss Exchange Ratio
Table 25. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model Parameter Estimates
Table 26. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model Summary of Fit
Table 27. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Analysis of Variance
Table 28. Significant Differences in Air Loss Exchange Ratio
Table 29. Screening Fit for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
Table 30. Percentage of Strategic Targets Killed Model Parameter Estimates
Table 31. Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Model Summary of Fit
Table 32. Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Analysis of Variance
Table 33. Significant Differences in Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
Table 34. Summary of Significant Factors Over All MOO/MOEs
Table 35. Summary of Significant Differences in Mean/Median Response

IX

13
26
60
64
87
104
108
117
118
119
119
119
121
122
123
123
123
125
126
127
127
127
129
129
130
130
131
133
133
134
134
135
137
138
138

Abstract
A validation assessment of THUNDER 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) module is accomplished using formulational and experimental
validation techniques. A comparison of ISR purposes and processes according to
military doctrine is made with the purposes and processes of ISR implemented within
THUNDER 6.5. This comparison provides an overview of the process, an understanding
of the level of aggregation within THUNDER, insight into possible problem areas in
THUNDER, and a basis for improving THUNDER ISR processes. Sensitivity analysis of
the ISR parameters as they relate to the Quality, Quantity, and Timeliness of ISR is also
presented to provide insight into the responsiveness of THUNDER to changes in ISR
capability for selected battle outcomes. Linear Regression and a Face-Centered Central
Composite Design were used to generate a response surface. Ninety-percent confidence
intervals were used to determine differences in mean response among the full factorial
design points.

A VALIDATION ASSESSMENT OF THUNDER 6.5'S INTELLIGENCE,
SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE MODULE

1. Introduction

1.1 Combat Modeling Tools
The modeling and simulation community employs a multitude of models that
differ according to their intended purpose. These models/simulations are grouped
together into categories - engineering, engagement, mission, and campaign - according to
their resolution, quantitative, and qualitative characteristics (see Figure 1). The numerous
models and the degrees of resolution are necessary to accommodate the wide range of
users and their fundamentally different information requirements [5].
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Figure 1. Air Force Analytical Toolkit Example [53]

Engineering

The quantitative differences among models involve scope, scale, duration, and
aggregation [5]. Each of these factors increases moving up the pyramid. The scope of an
engineering model is limited to one system or subpart, whereas the scope of a campaignlevel model includes the whole theater of war. The scale progresses up the pyramid from
representing components of a system at the engineering-level to combat engagements of
"many-on-many" in campaign-level models. The duration used in engagement models
focuses on discrete times or events such as target acquisition, whereas campaign models
include many operations and can simulate a whole war. The aggregation level of
components also increases from engineering to campaign-level models. In fact,
campaign-level models aggregate the output of engineering/engagement model and use
this aggregated output as input data. Figure 2 displays the differences among model
resolution and interactions.
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Figure 2. Comparison of Model Resolutions [5]

Qualitative differences also exist among the models. These differences include
human behavior representation, measures of effectiveness employed, and use of the
output. Human decision-making is seen in engagement and mission-level models. It is
not found in engineering models since they are concerned with physical processes, and
campaign level models exclude it mostly due to the large number of decision points and
choices that can make it unmanageable [5]. The measures of effectiveness change as one
moves up the pyramid. An engineering-level model measures its output in scientific
terms such as amps, whereas campaign level models must relate their output to a
warfighting context such as days to achieve air superiority [5]. How the output of the
model is used also differs among the levels of the pyramid. As the quantitative and
explicit representation of elements decreases, models become less useful in predictive
capability and become more useful for simply providing insight into a system's influence
on the warfighting scenario. "Given [the] level of complexity, the results of campaign
simulations should be seen as less an 'answer' than an insight, less predictive than
indicative" [5].
THUNDER is positioned in the Air Force's Analytical Toolkit (Figure 1) at the
campaign-level and is considered the Air Force's premier campaign-level model.
THUNDER is an "...analytical tool designed to help senior decision-makers evaluate
strategy, tactics, force structure, and operational effectiveness in a joint warfighting
context" [47]. It is an important tool in evaluating the impact of proposed weapon
systems, technology, tactics, and doctrine on combat outcomes.

1.2 Problem Statement
Intelligence is critical to the success of military operations. Timely, accurate
intelligence can be the defining element between victory and defeat. This aspect of war
must be incorporated into combat models to ensure the model is an effective tool and that
combat is correctly represented.
THUNDER has integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
representation into its combat processes. The ISR module of THUNDER affects many
aspects of the war, including prioritization of targets, aircraft/munition selection, target
acquisition, and ground unit attrition. Since the complex and compounding effects of
ISR significantly impact campaign outcomes in the real world, one must ensure that the
impact of ISR is accurately represented in THUNDER. Ensuring a model accurately
reflects a real-world process is accomplished through validation. The purpose of this
thesis is to assess the validity of the ISR module of THUNDER 6.5.

1.3 Validation of Models
Validation is defined by Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, as "The process of determining the degree to which a
model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective
of the intended uses of the model or simulation" [9:488].
Campaign-level models are very difficult to validate due to the complexity of
factors and the lack of real world data. Also, because models like THUNDER are used
for analyses on proposed future system, validating outcomes is often impossible. One
inherent problem with validation is the definition of reality. The most common

references for establishing validity are field experts and historical data. For this study,
reality is defined by current military doctrine and instructions about ISR.
This thesis used two approaches to assess the validity of THUNDER 6.5's ISR
module. The first approach examines the real world ISR process and to compares it with
the ISR process within THUNDER, and the second is to perform an experiment to verify
the sensitivity of the ISR processes on combat outcomes. Both of these approaches are
necessary for validation, but neither one alone is sufficient. Comparative analysis
between competing systems is a primary use of campaign models. A model that
represents the parameters well, but lacks in providing representative output has limited
use. On the other hand, a model that provides correct output, but does not represent the
parameters well may be unable to provide insight if, or when, reality changes or a new
scenario is introduced.
These two approaches also fit into the "four major interdependent types of
validation" presented by Oral and Ketanni: formulational, experimental, operational, and
data validation [32:223].
Comparing the processes provides for formulational validation as it is "...mainly
concerned with the degree of capacity of the 'formal model' to describe correctly and
accurately [real world events]" [32:224]. Experimental validation primarily deals with
"...the quality of solutions, the types of solutions, the nature of solution techniques, and
the efficiency of solution procedures" [32:224]. The experiment performed in this study
focuses on the quality of solutions as it relates to the level of insight gained about the
warfighting scenario and the sensitivity to changes in the values of the ISR parameters.
Operational validation which refers to the "...usability, usefulness, timeliness, synergism,

and the cost of implementing a decision based on the solutions provided by the 'formal
model'" [32:226] is beyond the scope of this thesis. Data validation involving
"...sufficiency, accuracy, appropriateness, availability, maintainability, reliability, and
cost of data" [32:222] is not relevant to this thesis.

1.4 Modeling and Validating Intelligence
THUNDER'S ISR module can be used to evaluate intelligence systems in terms of
their contributions to combat outcomes. This evaluation allows for comparisons between
systems and their capabilities as well as the combined value of a group of systems.
Intelligence is difficult to measure, and difficult to validate because of the
uncertainty it adds to combat situations. A RAND study [2] on assessing the combat
value of intelligence identifies two main reasons why modeling intelligence systems
largely increases the uncertainty that already exists in a model. These reasons are soft
(human) factors and nonlinearity.
Intelligence produces information. Information influences human decisions.
Modeling a human decision process is difficult, hard to represent, hard to calibrate, and
hard to validate; therefore, it is often poorly reflected in modeling [2:2]. "This neglect is
sometimes justified either because human factors are believed to be less critical than
'hard' technical characteristics or because there are so many human actors involved that
their actions can be represented statistically by aggregate probabilities, depending on the
application" [2:2]. Combat elements such as target acquisition can be modeled with these
hard characteristics, however, elements such as situation assessment require the
commander's decision process to be modeled. "Focusing only upon target acquisition

would provide a more tractable problem but would systematically underestimate the
value of [intelligence]" [2:2].
Intelligence has a highly nonlinear effect on battle. In and of itself, intelligence is
of no value, but its effectiveness is seen through the enhancement of other combat
elements. The effect of intelligence can be largely dependent on the situation and
decision at hand. For example, if an aircraft has expended its munitions, knowing where
the next target is with a high degree of accuracy is of no consequence. However, when a
".. .single command decision means the difference between victory and defeat (for
example deciding when to commit strategic reserves),.. .the effect of one piece of critical
intelligence is so nonlinear as to be essentially discontinuous" [2:3]. This fact increases
the uncertainty. Small changes in input can result in large changes in output.
Although the difficulty in modeling ISR is great, the importance of ISR and its
effects on combat outcomes make it an essential element that cannot be omitted if a
model is to truly represent combat operations.

1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized into chapters according to subject areas. Chapter 2
presents an overview of THUNDER, some of its components, users, and history. Chapter
3 provides information on current military doctrine concerning the purposes and
principles of ISR. Chapter 4 examines the ISR process and its elements. The objective
of Chapters 3 and 4 is to demonstrate the complexity and breadth of the ISR process in
the real world. This complex, sometimes unquantifiable, process has to be resolved into
something that can be represented by a model, and Chapter 5 explains how THUNDER

currently accomplishes that goal. The comparison between the ISR purposes and
processes in the real world and in THUNDER is presented in Chapter 6. This
comparison provides an overview of the process, an understanding of the level of
aggregation within THUNDER, insight into possible problem areas in THUNDER, and a
basis for improving THUNDER ISR processes. The scope of the comparison is reserved
to major steps in the processes, with some discussion of lower details to analyze whether
the aggregation within THUNDER is appropriate. Chapter 7 examines how THUNDER
reacts to changes in ISR capability. Sensitivity analysis of parameters relating to the
quality, quantity, and timeliness of ISR provides insight into the responsiveness of
THUNDER to the ISR module. The final chapter, Chapter 8, presents the conclusions of
this thesis and recommendations for improving THUNDER'S ISR module.
Throughout this thesis, the term THUNDER refers to the THUNDER version 6.5.

2. THUNDER Overview

2.1 Introduction
THUNDER is a two-sided, stochastic, campaign-level model of conventional air
and land warfare, with some naval representation. It is the campaign-level model of
choice for the Air Force that has been used in high level decision-making activities such
as determining the advantages of the F-22 and the effect of the Global Positioning System
(GPS) on the warfighter. This chapter presents a brief overview of the model, its users,
history, and verification and validation efforts.

2.2 Model Functional Design
The battlefield is modeled as a rectangular area which can be oriented in any
direction that the user specifies. It is subdivided into grid squares, whose sizes are also
defined by the user. A Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) line spans the width of the
battlefield and divides the two opposing sides, referred to as Red and Blue. See Figure 3.
The battlefield is further divided into sectors and zones, as seen in Figure 4.
Sectors represent commands that own units and can control portions of the FLOT. Each
sector is divided into zones that generally represent areas in which certain ground
activities take place. Units that are engaged in combat are located in the zone adjacent to
the FLOT.
The ISR grid in THUNDER is similar in shape and form to the battlefield grid
and can be thought of as overlaying the battlefield grid.

Grid Size

FLOT
Width

Battlefield Depth

Figure 3. Battlefield Grid [51:3]

Red

Blue
Sector 1

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

Sector 2

Sector 3

Sector 4

FLOT
Figure 4. Battlefield Sectors and Zones [51:4]
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The ground war within THUNDER is a deterministic model based on the United
States Army's Concept Evaluation Model (CEM). The CEM uses the Attrition
Calibration (ATCAL) process and the United States Army Concepts and Analysis
Agency's Combat Sample Generator (COSAGE) model to adjudicate ground combat on
a cyclical basis defined by the user. Units engaged in combat move strictly back and
forth (similar to movement such as a piston) within a sector. Theater level supplies and
logistics for both air and ground forces are modeled using mathematical transportation
networks. Unit consumption data comes from the US Army Combined Arms Support
Command (CASCOM).
For the air war, THUNDER simulates 27 different air missions such as airborne
refueling, close air support, defensive counter-air, fighter sweep, long range air
interdiction, reconnaissance, and standoff reconnaissance. Some of the missions defined
in THUNDER are merely subsets of air missions defined by Air Force doctrine. These
subsets allow for finer fidelity to capture desired effects, as well as for modeling
convenience. THUNDER "...automatically generates Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) based
on theater level apportionment and target priorities. A scheduler builds ATO packages,
taking into consideration aircraft range, weather capability, weapons configurations,
weapons effectiveness, weapons availability, and target availability" [54:2].
THUNDER is data driven and relies on a myriad of engineering and engagement
models to provide its data inputs and calculations. For example, BRAWLER is used
extensively for air-to-air information; ES AMS is used for surface-to-air missile
probability of kill (Pk) data; and RADGUNS for anti-defense artillery Pks. Some other
aspects of war modeled in THUNDER are: airbase operations including maintenance of

11

aircraft and runway repair; cruise missile attacks and defense; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR); perception and "fog of war"; strategic attacks; multiple-target
missions; and the effects of weather.
THUNDER is written in SIMSCRIPT II.5, a general-purpose programming
language particularly suited for large, discrete-event simulations. THUNDER contains
about 300,000 lines of code divided into over 1,350 routines. It operates on Sun and
Silicon Graphics Unix workstations.

2.3 Users
THUNDER is used by a large number of U.S. and allied defense organizations
and contractors such as Air Force Studies and Analyses Information Superiority Branch
(AFSAA/SAAI), AFSAA Wargaming Branch (AFSAA/SAAW), Air Force Wargaming,
HQ ACC/XP-SAS, Boeing North American, Lockheed Martin Tactical Aeronautical,
Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon Systems Company. It is also used internationally by
British Aerospace, Defense Science and Technology Organisation (Australia), RAF Air
Warfare Centre, and the Republic of Korea Air Force.

2.4 Assumptions
Because of the amount of aggregation needed in campaign level models,
numerous assumptions are made regarding data validity. Users must understand how
input data has been aggregated, and how the model uses the data. Aside from that, the
three major assumptions identified for THUNDER for any campaign being studied are:
1) The war is between two nation-state sized adversaries in a single theater of
operations.

12

2) A defined boundary exists between opposing sides in the model.
3) The campaign can be expressed by a four-part process: Perception, Planning,
Execution, and Adjudication.
2.5 Origin and History
THUNDER was originally developed from TAC WARRIOR, a campaign-level
model used in the 1970's and early 1980's. As TAC WARRIOR evolved, it became
difficult to modify, the documentation no longer matched the code, and the assumptions
of the model became invalid. To compensate for this, Air Force Studies and Analyses
developed THUNDER from 1983-1986. THUNDER achieved its initial operating
capability in 1985, and the first operational version was released in 1986. CACI, Inc.
performed maintenance and upgrades from 1987-1993. Since 1993, both CACI, Inc. and
System Simulation Solutions, Inc. (S3I) have maintained THUNDER. The most current
version is THUNDER 6.5, released in November of 1997. Table 1 shows the history of
THUNDER model releases and some of the developments.
Table 1. THUNDER Release Chronology [50:5-7,11]
Release Date 1 Version | Significant modification/enhancement
VAX/VMS support
3.0
Aug87
CACI Products Company assumes configuration control
SUN/UNIX support
4.0
May 88
4.4
Situation map
Jan 89
Graphic utility
Enhancement
of air defense module and ground module
4.6
Nov89
Incorporation of rear-area transportation network
5.1
Jun90
Enhanced Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses functions
Enhancement of airfield attack mission
5.5
Jun91
Introduction of detailed logistics resource
accounting methodology
Enhancement of air mission planning
Addition of strategic target interdiction
5.6
May 92
Enhanced ground attrition methodology

13

Dec 92

5.8

Feb93

5.9

Sep93

6.0

May 94

6.1

Jun94

6.2

Jun95

6.3

Sep96

6.4

Nov97

6.5

Addition of high-fidelity sortie rate profiles
Addition of high-resolution aircraft maintenance module
Improved methodology for treating
overrun/abandoned airbases
Addition of time-dependent aircraft planning factors
Accommodation of multiple target sorties
Incorporation of new flight missions:
Enhanced terminal air defense logic
Deterministic weather model
Major revision of air-to-surface adjudication methodology
Enhanced/standardized target repair methodology
Enhanced air-to-surface targeting prioritization
Higher resolution aerial refueling methodology
Enhanced air mission abort rules
Improved sortie scheduling algorithm in ATO generator
Improved flight path logic
Accommodate survivability in configuration selection
More flexible SEAD corridor selection logic
Model effects of integrated air defense systems
More explicit play of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) systems and effects
Higher fidelity surface-to-air lethality data
Accommodate integrated lethal/non-lethal SEAD mission
Improved terminal delivery profile to accommodate
weapon specific delivery requirements
Enhanced flight path generation algorithm to avoid
area SAM threat
Major ISR methodology improvements
Addition of satellites to ISR module
Incorporation of explicit TBM model and anti-TBM
missions (pre/post-launch)
Improved carrier battle group play
Interdictable ISR nodes
Weather effects on ISR
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Chem/Bio)
Enhanced target acquisition and discrimination
Improved air network paths
Use perceived threat in air network survivability
calculations
Enhanced terminal air defense
Incorporate tactical airlift
Rule-based air planning
Cyclic carrier operations
Ground force engagement rules
Grid-based air defense enhancements
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2.6 Current Verification and Validation Efforts [54]
Verification of a model ensures that the model runs as intended. THUNDER
conforms to the industry-accepted software standards for design and coding. The coding
standards ensure that the code is understandable, promoting efficiency in maintenance
and implementing new developments. The standards also give analysts the ability to
quickly comprehend the algorithms, providing insights into model assumptions and
expected outcomes. Along with "easy to read" code, comments embedded in the code
are also helpful analysis tools.
THUNDER'S Configuration Management Plan accounts for version control and
release authority through a Revision Control System, a Configuration Control Board, and
a formal release cycle and version numbering system. The Revision Control System
archives changes to the model. The Configuration Control Board is the formal authority
for reviewing model modifications and approving model changes.
All elements of the core THUNDER model were verified during the original
implementation through requirements-to-design tracing, walkthroughs and formal
reviews of the code, component and integration testing, and alpha and beta release test
phases. These elements are also re-evaluated during significant modifications or
enhancements to baseline releases.
Validation of a model ensures that the model accurately reflects the process or
system that it represents. THUNDER uses two methods in its validation process:
structural validation and output validation. In structural validation, subject matter experts
evaluate the algorithms and code to determine if the implementation of the model will
match the intent of the programmers. Output validation involves subject matter experts
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examining results to determine the extent that the implementation of the model matches
expected outcomes. The output subject matter experts involved in THUNDER validation
are usually members of the organization funding a modification.

2.7 Summary
THUNDER is an extremely large and complex model that is continually being
updated to improve its ability to model various and new aspects of war. It can be
cumbersome for the user as the model requires an enormous amount of data - almost 100
input files are required. However, the usefulness of the model cannot be overstated. Its
real value comes from the analysis of various weapon types, capabilities, strategies, and
their interactions. Using point estimates of model outcomes can be misleading due to the
numerous input data assumptions and systemic limitations. The high level of aggregation
in campaign models is somewhat of a disadvantage, but not something resolvable.
Careful and valid data aggregation from higher resolution models is needed to lessen this
disadvantage.
THUNDER is considered a valid, highly effective model for the Air Force. Its
strength is that the Air War is modeled at a slightly higher resolution than is available
elsewhere, with the automatic ATO generator saving a lot of user input time. The
Ground War is deterministic, which saves on run-time, but it provides for somewhat
limited interaction between air and ground units. Ship-to-ship naval warfare is not
modeled, but that does not seem to impair the model's usefulness.
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3. Intelligence, Surveillance. Reconnaissance Overview

3.1 Introduction
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations are used for
numerous military purposes and involve a variety of agencies and support systems to
accomplish its objectives. This chapter presents some background on ISR, its purposes,
players, products, and underlying systems.

3.2 Definitions
3.2.1 Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance is defined as "The capability to
collect, process, exploit and disseminate accurate and timely information that provides
the battlespace awareness necessary to successfully plan and conduct operations" [15:8].
Intelligence is the "Product resulting from the collection, processing, integration,
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign
countries, military capabilities, political groups, technological developments or certain
geographic areas" [15:8]. Intelligence is obtained through surveillance and
reconnaissance. Although surveillance and reconnaissance are similar, they are distinct
enough to warrant separate definitions.
Surveillance is the "Sustained or systematic observation of aerospace, surface or
subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or
other means" [15:8]. A typical example of a platform used for surveillance is the E-8
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) which orbits for a relatively
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long period of time and provides continuous updates on enemy strength, location, and
movement.
Reconnaissance is defined as "A transitory mission undertaken to obtain, by
visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area" [15:8].
As opposed to a sustained mission as in surveillance, reconnaissance missions do not
provide continuous coverage of an area, but instead collect data on a discrete basis. An
example of reconnaissance is a passing satellite taking a picture of a Scud missile
launcher.
Another contrast between surveillance and reconnaissance is that surveillance
data is generally passed on a real-time basis and usually comes from one source. The
data provided is most often perishable and needed immediately, even before analysis.
Reconnaissance data usually passes through a processing phase of evaluation by analysts
and fusion with other data [34:14].
Surveillance and reconnaissance resources gather data that can be processed,
analyzed, and/or fused to produce intelligence. Fusion is the process of combining data
from various collection sources to produce more accurate information than from one
source alone. Fusion provides a more comprehensive, yet focused, intelligence product.

3.3 Intelligence Purposes
The role of ISR in conducting a successful campaign is paramount. From before
hostilities begin, through the end of the campaign and beyond, the Joint Force
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Commander (JFC) must continually develop and refine the assessment of the everchanging situation. With adequate ISR capability the JFC has the means to provide this
assessment and in certain circumstances to attain information superiority. Knowing the
enemy's vulnerabilities, strengths, and intentions allows the JFC to exploit opportunities
and ultimately defeat the enemy. Intelligence derived from good ISR also provides the
ability to assess the effectiveness of operations and aids in determining if and when the
overall mission has been accomplished. Although there are many uses and purposes for
intelligence, Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations"
[11:3.3-6], identifies the following as the six fundamental intelligence purposes:
1. Supporting the Commander - Intelligence should provide the commander
knowledge of the situation to aid in optimal decision-making about
operations.
2. Identifying and Determining Objectives - Intelligence should allow
commanders to determine objectives that complement national security policy
objectives and the derived military objectives.
3. Planning and Conducting Operations - Intelligence should provide necessary
information to develop, plan and execute combat operations.
4. Security of Operations/Avoiding Deception and Surprise - Intelligence
systems should be used to inhibit the enemy's attempt at deception and
surprise.
5. Security of Operations through Deception - When planning operations, the
commander should have knowledge of the enemy's command and control
systems and intelligence systems so that deception can be used against the
enemy.
6. Evaluating the Effects of Operations and Re-orienting Forces or Terminating
Operations - Intelligence should assist in evaluating operational results and
determining if objectives have been met.
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3.4 ISR Principles
Commanders and decision-makers at all levels of war depend upon ISR
operations to reduce uncertainties and to make better decisions. Certain "principles" or
"attributes" of intelligence are identified in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.2 (Draft),
"Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance" [15:11-15] and Joint Pub 2-0 [11:4.1416] which increase the responsiveness of ISR operations to commanders' needs. No one
principle or attribute is more important than another as most depend upon each other, and
sometimes trade-offs must be made. All of them must be considered to maximize ISR
operational effectiveness. These principles are:
1. Accuracy - Intelligence reports will rarely be 100 percent accurate because of
influences such as human error, the 'fog of war', the sophistication of enemy
systems, deception, and our own technical limitations. However, ISR
personnel must rely on their knowledge and experience, when corroborating
all available information to provide the most accurate picture possible.
Because absolute certainty cannot be achieved, a confidence level of the
information should be provided, and commanders must be made aware of the
limitations of the intelligence estimate given to them [34:2]. A confidencelevel scale such as that shown in Figure 5 can be used to communicate the
assessment of the intelligence provided.
2. Timeliness - To be used effectively, or to even be used at all, intelligence
must be received before a decision is made or an opportunity is missed. To
expend resources to gather intelligence, but then not have the intelligence
available in time to be used defeats the purpose of ISR operations. New
technology has influenced this principle more than any other, and continual
improvements are being made due to its utmost importance [34:3].
3. Objectivity - Intelligence must be "...unbiased, undistorted, and free from
political or other constraints" [11:4.14]. This relates to the principle of
accuracy. Intelligence must not be manipulated to achieve a desired result or
support a preconception.
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Confidence Levels
Confirmed

95% or greater

Probable

75% or greater

Likely

50% or greater

Possible

5% or greater

Doubtful

4% or less

Figure 5. Confidence Levels of Intelligence Estimates [11:4.13]

Unity of Effort/Interoperability - Cooperation between the various military
services and nationalities must exist at all levels of ISR operations.
Information must be shared to minimize duplication and maximize
effectiveness. Cross-cueing and analytical exchange can significantly
increase operational effectiveness. Interoperability among systems is a must
for this to occur.
Relevance - Intelligence produced should be applicable to determining,
planning, conducting, and evaluating operations [15:12]. It should enhance
situational awareness and support current and future operations. Relevance
must be considered when planning for collection to ensure the user's
requirements are met.
6. Usability - Intelligence must be disseminated in a form that does not require
any additional processing or analysis. The commander, planner, or war
fighter should be able to quickly identify and apply the intelligence received.
Producers and users of intelligence should use common terminology and
common means of communications to aid in usability. Producers must also
understand the circumstances in which users are applying the intelligence
received in order to best meet their needs.
Completeness - Commanders should have all available, relevant information
required to accomplish the mission. Prioritization of requirements aids in
ensuring that the most essential information is provided first.
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8. Readiness - Intelligence organizations need to stay abreast of developing
international situations and correctly identify potential trouble spots. During a
crisis, the ability to anticipate possible intelligence needs increases the
responsiveness of intelligence to the commanders that need it.
9. Fusion - Fusion helps to overcome the inherent weaknesses of individual
collection systems and the deception efforts of the enemy by combining
information from multiple sources and analyzing it to produce a
comprehensive intelligence product. The process of fusing data takes time
and counteracts the principle of timeliness. Although a fused product can
increase usability and accuracy, a balance must be sought with timeliness.
Fusion is not always required. Often, near-real-time collections must be acted
upon without correlation in a reactive situation. In all cases, however,
reliance on one source of information leaves the JFC subject to deception,
which could outweigh the advantage of timeliness.
10. Accessibility - Raw data must be accessible to ISR operators and analysts in
order for the ISR process to continue and for dissemination to take place.
Users must also have access to the final products. A push/pull system in
which users can "pull" the information they want and need provides them with
relevant information without overloading them by "pushing" too much
information. Security must be maintained, but classifying intelligence at the
lowest level possibly allows for greater accessibility.
11. Security - We must protect our own capabilities and intentions, and safeguard
our sources of intelligence. Declassification, sanitization, and releasability
issues must be understood and adhered to by all personnel. Although
overclassification is not desirable, using the need-to-know principle and
multilevel secure communications will help prevent putting sources at
unnecessary risk and will still enable users to receive needed information.
12. Survivability and Sustainability - The ISR system must not depend totally on
one type of intelligence, one means of intelligence production, or one means
of dissemination. The system must be survivable with adequate redundancy.
There should be no one critical node that, if destroyed, cripples the whole
system.
3.5 Intelligence Support
ISR supports conflict at all levels of war - strategic, operational, and tactical
(Figure 6). At the strategic level, ISR is used to formulate policy, plans, and strategy at
the national and theater levels. Strategic intelligence is used to form an overall picture
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before a crisis occurs, and then to enhance the overall picture once a crisis begins. It
supports national objectives, the formulation of policies, and the determination of
priorities. Strategic intelligence is also used to determine enemy capabilities, intentions,
and their centers of gravity. The enemy's centers of gravity are those "Characteristics,
capabilities, or [locations] from which a military force derives their freedom of action,
physical strength, or will to fight" [9:87], such as the mass of the enemy army, the
enemy's command structure, or public opinion.
Operational-level ISR is needed to aid the planning and conduct of major
operations within the theater. It focuses on intelligence collection, identification,
location, and analysis [19:6]. Identifying the enemy's capabilities and vulnerabilities is
essential for operational activities such as determining targets or achieving air superiority.
Tactical intelligence is required for planning and conducting tactical operations at
the component or unit level and focuses more on battles and engagements than longrange-planning [19:6]. Intelligence support to the tactical level of operations "...primarily
focus on support to mission planning, targeting and combat assessment" [15:11].

3.6 Types of Intelligence
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) is collected using "...visual photography, infrared
sensors, lasers, electro-optics and radar sensors... where images of objects are reproduced
optically on film, electronic display devices or other media" [34:16]. The main types of
images produced are called optical and non-optical images. "Optical imagery uses
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STRATEGIC LEVEL OF WAR:
Nation or group of nations determines
national or alliance security objective - uses
national resources to accomplish objectives

National
Command
Authority

Joint Force
Commander

7

Air Component
Commander

OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR:
Campaigns and major operations are
planned and conducted to accomplish
strategic objectives
TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR:
V Battle and engagements are
planned and executed to
accomplish military objectives

Wing/Squadron

Figure 6. Intelligence Support at all Levels of War [4]
natural illumination in the portion of the spectrum that humans can perceive unaided.
Non-optical imagery includes infrared and radar" [15:25]. Weather effects, such as
moisture in the air or cloud cover, can inhibit various sensor's ability to collect IMINT.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) provides information based on enemy
electromagnetic transmissions. SIGINT is categorized into Communications Intelligence
(COMINT), and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). ELINT can be broken down further
into Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), Telemetry Intelligence
(TELINT), and Radar Intelligence (RADINT). COMINT involves intercepting and
monitoring enemy communications. Although COMINT is an excellent source for
discovering enemy intentions, among its drawbacks are "...susceptibility to deception, the
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requirement for linguists, and the requirement to have line of sight with the transmitter
for very high frequency and ultra high frequency systems" [34:15]. ELINT involves
intercepting and monitoring non-communication emissions, such as radar. As with
COMINT, it also "...is susceptible to deception and suffers from a line-of-sight
requirement" [34:16]. Within ELINT, FISINT contains the ".. .technical information
derived from the intercept of electromagnetic emissions, such as telemetry, associated
with the testing and operational deployment of foreign aerospace, surface, and subsurface
systems" [15:26].
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) is defined as "The
information derived from the exploitation of sensor measurement and
signatures...collected by ground, airborne, and space systems, to identify distinctive
features of the source, emitter, or sender, such as infrared signatures or unique sound
characteristics" [15:26]. MASINT includes a variety of different types. (See Table 2).
A disadvantage of MASINT is the extended amount of time needed to produce the
MASINT product.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information by people with
first-hand knowledge of an enemy situation. HUMINT can result from many different
circumstances. Examples of HUMINT collection may be information collected by
Special Forces missions, aircrew debriefings, or enemy prisoners of war.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is information collected through media
available to the general public. Foreign newspapers, radio, television, and the internet
can provide valuable information on enemy knowledge and consciousness.
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Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) is derived from the exploitation of foreign
material. "Technical intelligence begins when an individual service member finds
something new on the battlefield and takes the proper steps to report it. The item is then
exploited at succeedingly higher levels until a countermeasure is produced to neutralize
the adversary's technological advantage" [11:GL13].
Counterintelligence (CI) is information gathered to protect against espionage,
sabotage, assassinations, or terrorism conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments
or foreign persons.
Table 2. Types of Intelligence [11:2.2]
MINT
PHOTOINT
SIGINT
COMINT
ELINT
FISINT
TELINT
RADINT
HUMINT
MASINT
ACINT
OPINT
ELECTROIRINT
LASINT
NUCINT
RINT
OSINT
TECHINT
CI

Imagery Intelligence
Photo Intelligence
Signals Intelligence
Communications Intelligence
Electronic Intelligence
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
Telemetry Intelligence
Radar Intelligence
Human Intelligence
Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Acoustical Intelligence
Optical Intelligence
Electro-optical Intelligence
Infrared Intelligence
Laser Intelligence
Nuclear Intelligence
Unintentional Radiation Intelligence
Open Source Intelligence
Technical Intelligence
Counterintelligence
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3.7 Intelligence Community
Many agencies make up what is known as the "Intelligence Community". These
agencies are comprised of both military and civilian personnel and are shown in Figure 7.
Each element of the community has its own defined function, but the interaction and the
cooperation among the individual elements is needed to support the ISR mission.

Central
Department
Intelligence,
of State
Agency/National
Security
Department of
Agency
Energy
National
Reconnaissance
Office

Department of
Treasury

Defense Intelligence
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Air ForceJntelligence

National Imagery
and Mapping/
Agen

T^vy

/Marine\

Intelligence/

Corps

Army

Vntelhgence

' Intelligence

Figure 7. Intelligence Community Membership [13:2.3]

3.8 Communications for ISR Operations
Communication is a cornerstone of any military operation. The ISR process and
its success also rest on the ability to communicate. Requesting information, tasking ISR
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assets, collecting data, and disseminating information, all rely on communication systems
to fulfill their purpose. There are a myriad of Command, Control, Communications,
Computer, and Intelligence (C4I) systems in existence, and most of them depend upon
satellites to relay necessary communications such as voice, fax, message, raw data,
imagery, and video. Communication satellites allow intelligence personnel to analyze
data from a location hundreds or thousands of miles from the battlefield.
The military depends upon its own communication satellites (MILSATCOM), as
well as commercially-leased communication satellites to move the massive amounts of
information needed during both peacetime and conflict. In addition to the International
Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT) and the International Telecommunications
Satellite (INTELSAT), which are the primary international commercial satellite carriers
leased by the DoD [14:7.11-14], there are numerous domestic companies which provide
leased communications through geosynchronous satellites. A handful of these
communication satellites are summarized below.
3.8.1 Communication Satellites
3.8.1.1 Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
The DSCS-III constellation currently has nine multi-channel Super-High
Frequency (SHF) satellites in geosynchronous orbits. DSCS-III can selectively negate
jamming directed at it with little impact to its transmission capabilities. It also contains a
".. .Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) single channel transponder package that serves
AFSATCOM users providing increased capabilities in a stressed environment" [14:7.23].
"DSCS provides the backbone for the transmission of high capacity command and
control, intelligence and multi-channel communications service" [10:33]. Additionally
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DSCS directly supports the Global Command and Control System (GCCS). "DSCS earth
stations connect to major voice, data, and message switching centers that rapidly link
critical circuits and systems to the Defense Information System Network (DISN) and
commercial networks" [10:33].
3.8.1.2 Milstar
Milstar is the next generation military satellite communication system designed to
provide survivable, jam-resistant command and control communications for strategic and
tactical forces worldwide. The Milstar constellation will consist of four satellites in low
inclined near-geosynchronous orbit operating in the Extremely-High Frequency (EHF)
band. "An advantage of Milstar over DSCS and UHF satellites is that it has a crosslinking capability that will allow direct transmission of communications from one
satellite to another without the intervention of ground relay stations" [14:7.46].
3.8.1.3 NATO Satellite System
The NATO IV system is a single satellite positioned over the Atlantic Ocean,
along with 27 satellite ground terminals, 2 control centers, and the NATO school segment
at Latina, Italy [37]. The NATO IV satellite has four SHF channel and two UHF
channels used "...primarily for diplomatic and military communications and intelligence
support to the Commander-in-Chief of NATO and to the National Command Authority of
NATO forces" [14:7.47]. The SHF footprint for the NATO IV-A contains Eastern
Canada, the Atlantic, parts of North Africa, Europe, and Southeastern Greenland. The
UHF footprint contains the Eastern United States, the Atlantic, South America, Africa,
and most of Greenland [37].
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3.8.1.4 Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)
The TDRSS constellation consists of a small number of satellites in
geosynchronous orbit that support near-real-time data transmission from low-earth
orbiting reconnaissance satellites over approximately 85 percent of the earth's surface.
"TDRSS offers a useful contingency capability, and the military pays $100M annually to
use TDRSS" [14:7.48-49].
3.8.1.5 UHF Follow-On (UHF F/O) Program
The US Navy is deploying a new constellation of UHF satellites to replace their
current Fleet Satellite Communications network; these satellites are called UHF F/O, or
UFO satellites. The plan is to have eight satellites in orbit, with two on-orbit spares. The
first UFO satellite was launched in 1994. These new satellites will "...employ Demand
Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) time division multiplexing techniques to allot
capacity to more users. Demand-based assignment means that unused transponder space
is dynamically reallocated in real-time based on precedence, greatly improving
information throughput" [14:7.53]. The last six satellites to deployed will also carry EHF
packages to improve "...anti-jam telemetry, command, broadcast and fleet
communications....The EHF modes, formats, and data rates will be subsets of those
employed on the MILSTAR system. Satellites 8, 9,10 will also provide Global
Broadcast (Joint Broadcast) Service (GBS)" [14:7.53].
3.8.1.6 International Maritime Satellite System (INMARSAT)
The International Maritime Satellite Organization is headquartered in London,
England with 79 member nations. INMARSAT provides voice, message, facsimile and
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data communications through four satellites in geosynchronous orbit and leased
transponders on other communications satellites [14:7.12-13].
3.8.1.7 International Telecommunications Satellite (INTELSAT)
INTELSAT provides telephone, television and data distribution services to people
on every continent, and is the world's largest commercial satellite communications
provider. [14:7.14].
3.8.2 C4 Architectures
The military employs a variety of Command, Control, Communications, and
Computers (C4) architectures as well. A few examples of these relating to ISR include
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), and Global Broadcast Service (GBS). These systems are briefly explained
below.
3.8.2.1 Defense Information System Network (DISN)
"DISN provides Defense-wide communications for the day-to-day operations of
the DoD and services at the core of DoD wartime commumcations for the National
Command Authority (NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Commanders-in-Chief
(CINC), and other critical users" [10:25]. It is the DoD's worldwide telecommunications
network that also incorporates interoperability with allied and coalition forces [42].
3.8.2.2 Global Command and Control System (GCCS )
The Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which replaced the World
Wide Military Command and Control System, is a comprehensive worldwide system
providing the National Command Authority (NCA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, combatant commanders, Services, Defense Agencies, Joint Task Force
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commanders and component commanders information processing and dissemination
capabilities to conduct Command and Control operations. GCCS has numerous functions
including providing situational awareness, readiness assessments, course of action
development, imagery exploitation, intelligence mission supports, crisis planning,
deliberate planning, operational plan generation, deployment of forces, indications and
warning, and real-time combat execution from a C4I perspective [10:47].
3.8.2.3 Global Broadcast Service (GBS)
The Global Broadcast Service system, in development, will be a space-based,
high data rate communications link for a one-way flow of intelligence, weather, and other
information over a widespread geographic area.
The GBS will be a system of uplink sites, broadcast satellites, receiver terminals,
and management processes for requesting and coordinating the distribution of
information products. Each GBS satellite in a near-worldwide constellation will be
served by a primary uplink site where information products are assembled and
transmitted to a high-powered satellite for relay to forces over a large area. GBS will
also have the capability to inject products directly from the theater it serves. A big
advantage of GBS is that with small receive terminals, mobile forces are no longer
restricted by the requirement for large, fixed antennas to receive information formerly
available only to command centers [10:43].
"GBS is an extension of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) and a
part of the overall DoD MILSATCOM Architecture. It will interface with, and augment
other major DoD information systems, such as the Global Command and Control System
(GCCS), as well as other theater information management systems" [21].
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4. Intelligence. Surveillance, Reconnaissance Process during Theater-level Conflict

The Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) process must be coordinated
at all levels of command and among all branches of the military, as well as with national
agencies. ISR involves many diverse assets that synergistically provide the fullest
understanding of the enemy, his capabilities, and his weaknesses. "This understanding
directly supports formulating military objectives and strategy, determining planning and
conducting military operations, and identifying the adversary's strategic, operational,
tactical centers of gravity" [15:3]. This chapter presents the ISR process used to
accomplish the purposes of ISR presented in Chapter 3. The overall process, with some
lower-level details, is presented to demonstrate the vast amount of operations,
coordination, and diversity of elements that must all function together for the process to
be successful.

4.1 Process Overview
The ISR process encompasses the methodology of transforming a need for
information into a product that fulfills that need. The ISR process entails seven main
steps: Plan, Task, Collect, Analyze, Disseminate, Evaluate, and Apply. This process
cycles throughout a conflict and, in certain cases, is modified and adapted to the scenario
at hand. For example, in some cases, analysis of raw data is not necessary, or even
desirable, and therefore that step in the ISR process may be bypassed. Also, it should be
realized that data is evaluated throughout the process to ensure sensors are functioning
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properly, and that the intended information is available. The ISR process is depicted in
Figure 8. Each step in the process is explained below.

Commander's
Guidance

User
Requirements

Feedback

Requirement Satisfied
Figure 8. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process [15:24]
4.1.1 User Requirement
During the transition from peace to hostilities, the NCA tasks the appropriate
CINC in the theater where military operations will occur. The CINC can assume the
responsibility of JFC or delegate the authority to a subordinate. "The JFC is the
commander of a unified command, subunified command, or Joint Task Force (JTF)
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authorized to exercise operational authority over a joint force to accomplish an assigned
mission. The JFC determines appropriate military objectives and sets priorities for the
entire joint force" [17:54].
Subordinate to the Joint Force Commander are the Commanders for the Joint
Force Air Component (JFACC), the Joint Force Land Component (JFLCC), the Joint
Force Maritime Component (JFMCC), and the Joint Force Special Ops Component
(JFSOCC). Each of these Component Commanders translates JFC objectives into
military operations. To conduct military operations, Component Commanders require
knowledge of the enemy and of the effectiveness of completed missions.
Although intelligence requirements emanate from any level of command, the
commander's information requirements are the principal drivers of the intelligence effort.
For this study, the JFC is considered the primary user, the one setting requirements for
the overall process.
The JFACC is the primary player in requesting intelligence support in this ISR
process. The JFACC has the responsibility of overseeing all air and space operations,
which form the backbone of intelligence operations. The JFACC ".. .recommends the
proper employment of air and space forces....The JFACC also plans, coordinates,
allocates, tasks, executes, and assesses air and space operations to accomplish assigned
operational missions" [17:59]. The JFACC is responsible for the production and
execution of the daily ATO. A key ingredient in the production of an effective ATO is
having timely and accurate intelligence.
Requirements for intelligence tie to past, present, and future operations. For
example, the JFACC must know the effectiveness of air strikes to make re-attack

35

decisions; surveillance helps in acquiring targets; and knowledge of enemy air defense
sites dictates air strike ingress and egress routes.
All levels of war have slightly differing requirements and uses of intelligence. At
the strategic level, campaign planners may need information about enemy intentions and
capabilities, available resources, and the geography of the battlefield. At the operational
level, enemy doctrine, personalities of enemy commanders, and enemy centers of gravity
are of interest. At the tactical level, the number, types, mobility, and equipment of enemy
forces are required. Commanders require quantitative items such as the status of a bridge
and the number of tanks; however, the commander also needs information on the
intangibles, such as how the enemy views his potential courses of action, and which are
the most likely to follow.
4.1.2 Planning
Intelligence organizations at the national level, in the combatant commands, and
subordinate joint forces all interact and support each other in order to fill JFC
requirements. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), the combatant
command intelligence officer (J-2), the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the subordinate
joint force J-2 and Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) are all responsible for
providing intelligence support to military operations.
The NMJIC is the national agency that serves as the focal point for all defense
intelligence activities in support of joint operations. It also provides a conduit to the
entire DoD intelligence community and organization in support of joint operations
[ll:xi].
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At the theater level, the JIC has the primary responsibility for ensuring that
combatant commanders and theater forces receive the required intelligence support
[28:xi].
At the joint task force level, the USE is responsible for the collection, analysis,
and fusion of intelligence, as well as the dissemination of intelligence and intelligence
products for the joint operations area [11 :xi].
Requirements must be validated by the combatant command J-2 with the JIC
tracking "...the status of research, validation, submission and satisfaction of all collection
requests received ..."[12:3.15].
After a requirement has been validated, it is determined whether a new collection
effort is needed or if the information has already been collected. If a new collection is
needed, planning begins to fulfill the requirement. Planning for ISR collection entails
prioritizing requests; determining available assets, their capabilities, as well as their
vulnerabilities; and considering the time constraints of the request versus the timeliness
of an asset's response [15:17]. Planning for intelligence collection is usually done in
conjunction with operational planning. Intelligence planning also requires coordinating
priorities with national-level and other theater-level agencies, and ensuring
communications support, manpower and equipment are available.
The Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) supports the JFACC in planning theater
ISR missions. It "...is the air and space operations planning and execution focal point for
the JTF and is where centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of air and
space operations occurs" [17:75]. Since intelligence collection is closely tied to
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operations, the JAOC must work intimately with the JIC in planning for air and space
intelligence collection.
The Joint Staff J-2 Deputy Directorate for Targeting Support, J-2T, is the manager
for target intelligence from national systems. The J-2T operates the NMJIC Targeting
and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Cell, which is the single national-level source of
targeting and BDA support to the JCS and combatant commands [13:5.8].
Planning for intelligence collection involves deciding which sensor or system can
best fill the requirement. This decision depends on numerous factors. Sensor capabilities
are considered in conjunction with the target characteristics and location and the type of
intelligence required. An asset's coverage footprint and its time over a target must meet
collection requirements. Timeliness is an important factor when deciding which sensor
to use; information that arrives too late is of no use. Planners need to think about the
availability of resources, the time needed to plan the mission, collect the data, process
and analyze the data and disseminate the results. Environmental factors including the
threat, terrain, and weather need to be examined. Threats to assets must be identified. A
sensor that must fly over a target is more vulnerable than a standoff system; satellite
sensors are the least vulnerable assets. Terrain may interfere with sensor capabilities that
require line-of-sight. Weather conditions such as cloud cover or rain can inhibit certain
sensors' capabilities. Each of these factors must be considered, and weighed against each
other, when planning for collection. Figure 9 shows the collection planning factors that
need to be considered in sensor or system selection.
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Figure 9. Collection Planning Factors [12:3.17]
Consideration is also given to how many sensors are needed. Redundancy may
guarantee the information is obtained, or possibly guarantee more accurate information,
but it will be at the cost of tying up limited ISR assets. Collection may need to be
coordinated so that cross-cueing between sensors can be used.
Intelligence requirements are filled by a multitude of sensors, platforms,
communication systems, dissemination systems, and analysts. Not all products are used
in the same way and for the same purpose. Intelligence products can be categorized into
many different uses. Some of these categories are indications and warning, near-real-
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time and real-time situational awareness, intelligence preparation of the battlespace,
target intelligence, and battle damage assessment. Planning for ISR activities requires
knowledge of the product required as that will have a big impact on the collector,
platform, and dissemination system chosen.
4.1.3 Tasking
Tasking converts intelligence requirements into collection requirements. The
Combat Plans Division in the JAOC schedules reconnaissance missions for theater ISR
assets. The assets are then tasked through the JAOC's dissemination of an ATO directly
to the units. National assets and HUMINT collectors are tasked slightly differently. For
these collection requirements, the JIC submits the request to the NMJIC for tasking of the
national systems and HUMINT collectors. The NMJIC is the focal point for intelligence
activities at the national level during crises, and is co-located in the Pentagon with the
National Military Command Center. A National Intelligence Support Team (NIST)
traditionally deploys to the JTF headquarters to provide an additional conduit to the
NMJIC.
National intelligence organizations that support the JFC on a full-time basis
include: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and
the State Department [13:1.3]. Most of these national agencies have liaison personnel or
support teams that are either stationed in theater or deploy to the theater to ease
communication and improve efficiency.
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The CIA has primary expertise in HUMINT collection, imagery, political and
economic intelligence. The Office of Military Affairs within the CIA is the point of
contact for the CIA's military support.
The DIA's mission ranges throughout the ISR process, from planning and
directing intelligence to carrying out BDA. The DIA's Directorate for Intelligence
Operations (DO) oversees collection requirements and operations. "The DO also directs
all non-tactical DoD HUMINT activities through the Defense HUMINT Services (DHS),
and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) activities through the Central
MASINT Office. The DHS provides HUMINT resources to support the joint force
requirements" [13:6.5].
The NSA "...provides SIGINT and information security (INFOSEC),
encompassing communications security (COMSEC) and computer security as well as
telecommunications support and operations security (OPSEC)" [13:7.1].
The National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA) primary mission is to
provide imagery intelligence and geospatial information. The NIMA coordinates
imagery collection; manages and tasks national assets; provides advisory tasking for
theater assets; and processes, exploits, disseminates, and evaluates imagery and IMINT.
The DIA is the overall coordinator for National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
support for DoD. The NRO provides the nation's space-based reconnaissance
capabilities through the operation of IMINT and SIGINT satellites. "IMINT
requirements are tasked through the NIMA and SIGINT requirements through the NSA"
[13:9.2].
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Each military service has intelligence activities supporting their individual
missions. Examples of some of these organizations are US Army Intelligence and
Security Command (INSCOM), National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), National
Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), and the US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).
Communicating with the appropriate agency for tasking an asset is an important
endeavor that must be understood. However, even after the appropriate sensor/platform
has been tasked, it is very possible that new, and possibly higher priority, or more timesensitive collections must be executed. Some missions may be dynamically re-tasked
with little consequence, while re-tasking may be impossible for others. The ability to
dynamically re-task assets depends on the situation, the time-sensitivity, the assets and
their capabilities, and the trade-offs between the current tasking and the new tasking.
4.1.4 Collection
Collection operations acquire information and provide it to processors and
disseminators. Many of the collection planning factors are considered at the time of
collection. Weather, vulnerability, threat, capabilities, along with other risks and the
overall operational situation, all determine how and when a sensor will make an assigned
collection. "For aerial-based systems, the wing or squadron commander normally has the
responsibility to accomplish the ISR mission. For ground-based systems, like Special
Operations Forces (SOF) or HUMINT, the responsibility lies with the competent
authority at the tactical level. The JFACC is the final authority on determining whether
the benefits of successfully accomplishing the mission outweigh the risks involved"
[15:19].
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Many different sensors are involved in ISR collection. There are manned and
unmanned systems; airborne, space, and ground systems; military, non-military, and
national systems; and technical versus human collection. Each system has particular
advantages, disadvantages, capabilities, and limitations. One may be accurate, but slow
to provide information, another may be highly survivable, but also highly predictable and
therefore more easily deceived. "It is desirable to have sensors cross-cue each other to
provide synergism that capitalizes on individual sensor strength. For example, J-STARS
was able to cross-cue unmanned aerial vehicles operated by the Marines during Desert
Storm. This allowed the Marines to pinpoint Iraqi defenses and monitor troop
movements..." [34:50]. The military uses a mix of systems to accomplish ISR
operations. Some of the common systems in today's ISR environment are identified
below.
4.1.4.1 Airborne systems
4.1.4.1.1 Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Figure 10. Predator Medium Altitude Endurance (MAE) UAV
The greatest advantage of UAVs is reduced risk to friendly personnel. UAVs
have other advantages such as long loiter times and relative cost effectiveness when
compared with manned aircraft missions. UAV support can provide near-real-time

43

intelligence and BDA to all military services. Various types of UAVs provide a broad
range of capabilities and uses. Tactical UAVs include Pioneer and Hunter, while UAVs
with more of a focus on longer ranges and longer dwell times include Predator, Global
Hawk, and DarkStar [49]. The main sensors found on UAVs are for SIGINT, Synthetic
Aperture Radar (SAR), Electro-optical imagery, multispectral imagery, and real-time
video imagery [15:27]. The UAV guidance and control systems are either remotely
controlled, preprogrammed, or some combination of both.
4.1.4.1.2 RC-135

Figure 11. RC-135V/W RIVET JOINT
The RC-135 is an Air Force reconnaissance version of a Boeing 707. The RC135's are considered national assets, but may be tasked by the theater commander during
wartime for tactical roles [34:16]. Various models of the RC-13 5 such as RC-13 5 U
Combat Sent, RC-135 V/W Rivet Joint, RC-135 X Cobra Eye, and RC-135 Cobra Ball
all provide SIGINT, to include COMINT and ELINT, with Cobra Eye and Cobra Ball
also providing MASINT [27].
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4.1.4.1.3 E-8C J-STARS

Figure 12. E-8C J-STARS
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) is a
modified Boeing 707 with a primary mission of air-to-ground surveillance. An Army and
Air Force multi-service system, J-STARS is used to locate, identify, and track ground
targets - both fixed and mobile - in near-real-time. It primarily focuses on non-emitting
targets making radar imagery intelligence its principal product [34:18]. J-STARS has a
long loiter time and a long range and can look deep into enemy territory to detect and
track ground movement in both forward and rear areas. It reports enemy location, size,
direction, rate of movement, and type of target [10].
J-STARS uses a phased array radar for collection with a range of over 150 miles [30].
Comprehensive communications allow J-STARS to provide voice and data transmissions
to a variety of platforms, weapons system, and ground modules. Satellite
communications allow J-STARS to pass information to users not in its line-of-sight.
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4.1.4.1.4 U-2

*P?a

Figure 13. U-2
The U-2 is a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft capable of gathering multisensor photo, electro-optic, infrared and radar imagery, as well as electronic intelligence
[48]. The U-2 has proven to be a very reliable aircraft with high mission completion
rates. Although it is not air-refuelable, it can fly for more than twelve hours, if necessary.
The U-2 has a long standoff range and can down-link saved or near-real-time imagery to
ground stations via line-of-sight transmissions [46].
4.1.4.1.5 EH-60L Quick Fix

Figure 14. EH-60L Quickfix
The EH-60L is an Army tactical helicopter that provides SIGINT and electronic
countermeasures (ECM) support to Army units. The data downlinked in near-real-time
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provides targeting information. System information provides input for the tasking and
mission direction of other assets [40].
4.1.4.1.6 E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS)

Figure 15. E-3 Sentry
The E-3 Sentry, AWACS, is a modified Boeing 707/320 commercial airframe
with a rotating radar dome. It provides all-weather surveillance, command, control and
communications to U.S. and NATO forces and has proven to be the "...premier air battle
command and control aircraft in the world today" [20]. The radar has a range of more
than 200 miles for low-flying targets and a significantly greater range for aircraft flying at
medium or high altitudes. The E-3 also has navigation, communications, and data
processing capabilities. Console operators view data in graphic or tabular formats to
perform ".. .surveillance, identification, weapons control, battle management and
communications functions" [20].
The E-3 systems gather detailed battlefield information such as position and
tracking of enemy aircraft and ships, and the location and status of friendly aircraft and
ships. "The information can be sent to major command and control centers in rear areas
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or aboard ships. In time of crisis, this data can be forwarded to the National Command
Authority in the United States" [20].
The E-3 supports air-to-ground operations by providing information for
interdiction, reconnaissance, airlift, and close-air support. For air defense, the E-3 can
detect, identify, and track enemy forces and direct fighter-interceptor aircraft to enemy
targets [32].
4.1.4.1.7 RC-12 Guardrail Common Sensor

Figure 16. RC-12Q GUARDRAIL COMMON SENSOR
The Army's Guardrail system supports the tactical commanders by providing
near-real-time SIGINT and targeting information for deep battle and follow-on forces
attack support. The Guardrail collects radio signals from selected low, mid and high
bands in order to identify/classify the signals, determine source locations, and provide
near-real-time reports to the commanders [24].
4.1.4.2 Space-based Systems
Satellite systems are an integral part of ISR operations. Satellites provide nearly
worldwide coverage, and are fairly immune to enemy actions (at least for now).
However, coverage is extremely predictable, and therefore susceptible to deception.
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Weather effects also hinder some systems. Space assets provide a variety of ISR
products including indications and warning of ballistic missile launches, weather and
terrain information, imagery, and signals intelligence. Many of the national systems used
are classified in name and capability. Two unclassified sensors are described below.
4.1.4.2.1 Defense Support Program (DSP)
The DSP satellites provide the nation's current space-based early warning system.
DSP satellites detect ballistic missile launches around the world. They have the
capability to detect short-range missiles, such Scuds, as well as the longer-range
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The DSP system consists of the satellites, the
ground processing stations, and the communication system. Although the
communication of Scud launch detections to the Patriot batteries functioned well during
Desert Storm, significant improvements in communications have made the DSP reports
even more timely. Early warning capabilities will continue to be enhanced with new
systems being developed such as the Space-Based Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) and SpaceBased Radar.
4.1.4.2.2 SPOT Satellite System
The SPOT satellite Earth Observation System was designed by the CNES (Centre
National d'Etudes Spatiales), France, and developed with the participation of Sweden and
Belgium. The system comprises a series of satellites in circular, sun-synchronous orbits
along with ground facilities for satellite control and programming, image production and
distribution [44].
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4.1.4.3 Ground-based systems
Some ground-based systems, such as those of the theater air control system
(TACS) are not tasked as ISR assets, but do provide surveillance as a by-product of their
primary mission. One ground-based ISR resource is the Space Surveillance Network
which tracks and catalogs all manmade objects in space. The Ballistic Missile Early
Warning System is a ground-based system of radars to detect strategic missile launches.
HUMINT is gathered by people such as Special Operations Forces doing a
reconnaissance mission, aircrews, dedicated HUMINT personnel, or prisoners. Below
are three examples of the systems used in ground-based collection.
4.1.4.3.1 Counterintelligence/Human Intelligence Automated Tool Set

Figure 17. CHATS
The Counterintelligence /Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) Automated Tool Set
(CHATS) can be operated up to the SECRET level. It provides CI/HUMINT teams in
the field the capability to "...manage assets and analyze information collected through
investigations, interrogations, collection, and document exploitation. With CHATS, CI
units may electronically store collected information in a local database, associate
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information with digital photography, and transmit/receive information over existing
military and civilian communications" [8].
4.1.4.3.2 Ground Based Common Sensor (GBCS)

Figure 18. GBCS-H
"Ground-Based Common Sensor (GBCS Heavy and Light) GBCS is the Army's
only on-the-ground, all-weather, all-terrain, self-contained, fully integrated, 24-hour
signal intelligence and electronic warfare asset. The Electronic Attack (EA) module
includes smart jamming capabilities. The GBCS preprocesses signal data at the sensor
and provides target detection, identification, and location reports in near-real-time" [23].
4.1.4.4 Sea-based systems
Dedicated intelligence units, along with assets that have other primary functions,
such as a destroyer at sea sending a surface contact report, conduct naval intelligence. In
fact, naval forces are unique in that intelligence collection capabilities are resident in
many of their weapons platforms. At the tactical and operational levels of warfare,
intelligence collection is just one more capability of ships, submarines and aircraft [19:5].
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For years the attack submarine has performed various ISR roles, and in the future
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) or drones may also be used to venture into
areas unsafe for a submarine. These AUVs would be launched, travel into the area,
perform the assigned mission, and then return to the submarine or transmit its data to a
satellite [45].
4.1.5 Analyze
After data has been collected, it is processed and then analyzed. Some sensors
have "on-board" processing capabilities, while others must send the raw data to a
production center. Processing involves converting information into a format usable by
intelligence personnel. After processing, the data is analyzed either at the production
center or an intelligence center. Through analysis and fusion, information is then
integrated into the battlefield picture. Fusion is the result of comparing and combining
data from various collectors along with previous analysis to provide an integrated,
hopefully more accurate, understanding of the true state of the object of collection.
Analysis involves human thinking and determination in deciding which information is
most correct and useful in determining the final conclusion. Knowledge of the enemy,
professional experience, and judgment affect an analyst's ability to interpret and decipher
the significance of new information, and determine its integration with previous
intelligence. When trying to "fuse" data, analysts consider the means in which the data
was collected, and its associated reliability and capability. They also factor in the time
since the data was collected. Integrating new data with other sensor information and
previous data is somewhat subjective to the experience level of the analyst. The level of
work and the time allotted to arrive at a conclusion also impacts the ability of analysts to
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accurately fuse the data. Almost all data is fused and analyzed before being disseminated
to the appropriate agencies. However, as stated before, some data can be processed and
distributed in near-real-time from ISR assets directly to the users bypassing the analysis
and fusion procedure. This "short-cut" intelligence process supports the "Sensor-toShooter" concept so that perishable data can be used right away in circumstances such as
locating and killing an intruding aircraft [15:19]. This type of intelligence is useful at the
tactical level, although most operational and strategic intelligence is most useful and
reliable after being analyzed and fused. The resulting products from analysis are reports
concerning items such as enemy capabilities, resources, and activities. BDA is a critical
output of analysis heavily impacting target development and target nomination
procedures.
Various forms of intelligence are processed differently and by different agencies.
For example, HUMINT/CI information processing primarily involves report preparation
by personnel within the J-2X. "Further processing human resource reporting is
conducted by the JIC and joint force analytical and/or production activities; this primarily
involves analyzing HUMINT/CI reporting for inclusion in all-source production and/or
for data base maintenance" [12:3.26].
The JIC processes and exploits imagery in theater. The JIC can process the
digital signal and display it on a workstation in softcopy form. The images can then be
incorporated into an all-source product to aid in determining the status of a target or other
item of interest. The images can also be used to update intelligence databases.
"COMINT processing is accomplished by NSA/CSS elements either assigned to
or in support of the joint force mission. ELINT processing in support of a joint force may
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come from a number of sources including assets attached to the joint force, national
ELINT centers, the JC2WC, and combatant command JICs" [12:3.28].
MASINT tends to be a processing-intensive collection discipline. The Central
MASINT Office and Service intelligence centers process MASINT [12:3.28].
4.1.5.1 Processing and analysis systems
Processing and analysis can be made easier through the use of computers and
computer systems. Some of the systems used by intelligence personnel are summarized
below.
4.1.5.1.1 Joint Service Imagery P rocessing System (JSIPS)
JSIPS is a j oint program developed by the USAF, US Navy (USN), and US
Marine Corps (USMC) to provide a common ground station "...capable of receiving,
processing, exploiting, and disseminating imagery intelligence products collected by
national, theater, and selected tactical reconnaissance assets" [31].
4.1.5.1.2 Enemy Situation Correlation Element (ENSCE)
The Army and Air Force are developing better ways to coordinate the efficient
use of surveillance/reconnaissance systems and selection of second-echelon targets
through the use of automated intelligence fusion centers. "The Army All-Source
Analysis System (ASAS) and the Air Force Enemy Situation Correlation Element
(ENSCE) speed the fusion and correlation of intelligence sources and provide a common
view of the battlefield. The ASAS/ENSCE system will be an all-source system,
receiving inputs from tactical Army collection systems (such as Guardrail and
Quicklook), J-STARS, and ATARS, and national intelligence sensors" [34:22].

54

4.1.5.1.3 Sentinel Byte
JSIPS and ENSCE only provide intelligence to the headquarters level. To transfer
this all-source intelligence to the users at the wing and squadron level, the Air Force is
deploying the Sentinel Byte system. "Sentinel Byte is an interactive intelligence system
for passing intelligence, targeting, and battle damage assessment information up and
down the chain of command within the tactical air control system" [34:23].
4.1.5.1.4 Constant Source
"Constant Source is a broadcast system designed to provide timely intelligence to
combat units and elements of the tactical air control system at the secret or higher level"
[34:24]. Constant Source integrates and correlates information received from the Navy's
Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications (TRAP) and the Tactical Data
Information Exchange System -Broadcast (TADIX-B) including data from national
systems [7].
Constant Source correlates reports and compares new information with already
existing, or known, information. It updates "...data bases, refines emitter locations, and
identifies moving targets and movements of known sites" [34:24].
Constant Source can also filter data according to the user's desires. The display
can provide color graphics of correlated tracks overlaid on a map. An alarm is used to
alert the user to high-interest events, and the user may watch events in near-real-time as
well as review past events.
4.1.6 Dissemination
The joint intelligence architecture allows collectors, producers, and users of
intelligence to be interconnected and share information. Interoperable systems link
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intelligence agencies at all levels - theater JICs, JISEs, Service intelligence, and national
organizations.
Information is only useful if those who require it actually receive it.
Dissemination is the distribution of intelligence to users in a suitable form. It is a critical
step as timely dissemination of information is necessary for optimal decision-making.
Decisions can only be based upon previous knowledge and relevant new information that
has been received. If new information does not arrive in time to provide a better
understanding of the current situation, decisions must be made somewhat in ignorance.
This can cost money, resources, and human lives.
Dissemination comes is a variety of forms and includes physical transfer of
information, digital and analog media, video-teleconference, telephone, FAX machine,
remote access to data bases, radio, satellite broadcasts, etc. However, the aim of
dissemination is not to overwhelm the user with massive amounts of data. The concept
for dissemination today is a push/pull methodology that emphasizes pushing intelligence
to the warfighter (through over-the-air updates) and allows the warrior to pull information
on demand [11:2.7]. Dissemination should provide an optimum, rather than a maximum,
amount of information.
The Defense Intelligence Dissemination System (DIDS) manages the push
concept. Before "pushing" information, the producer queries the DIDS. The pull
concept involves accessing information through databases, files, or other means used by
intelligence organizations. "Pull" products are available through a number of ways,
including INTELINK and the GBS.
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While hardcopy distribution of intelligence is possible, with new technology and
the need to improve timeliness, most intelligence products are disseminated in electronic
form. Some of the communication tools used to share information are Joint Worldwide
Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), Joint Deployable Intelligence Support
System (JDISS), DoD Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS), Open Source
Information System (OSIS), Global Command and Control System (GCCS), INTELINK,
and GBS [12:3.43]. "The joint intelligence architecture uses JWICS and JDISS as the
joint standard and foundation for commonality among support systems" [11:7.5]. The
GCCS and GBS were presented earlier in this report; the rest of the tools are summarized
below.
4.1.6.1 Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS)
DODIIS comprises the worldwide inter-computer network linking Intelligence
Data Handling Systems (IDHS). It encompasses the intelligence storage and retrieval
devices (IDHS), the transmission means (JWICS) and the interface (JDISS or other
computer interface systems).
DODIIS provides input processing for a variety of intelligence products,
including "...imagery exploitation, ELINT, COMINT and HUMINT, as well as,
intelligence data development, target material production, target data development and
scientific and technical intelligence" [14:7.34-35].
4.1.6.2 Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS)
The JDISS allows for connectivity and interoperability with the intelligence
systems at the headquarters level as well as the deployed units. JDISS has evolved into a
widely accepted intelligence workstation standard and is the "...technical baseline for the
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DoDIIS client/server environment" [29]. It provides the JIC, JTF and operational
commanders with on-site automation support such as transmitting and receiving specific
requests for intelligence, accessing databases, supporting digitized imagery exchange,
and performing multi-media functions such as electronic publishing and video
teleconferencing. "Based on a SunSparc workstation with an open systems architecture,
JDISS is equipped with a core set of software applications that give the intelligence
analyst access to a large number of intelligence databases.. .as well as the ability to
perform independent multi-disciplined intelligence analysis in the field" [14:7.32].
4.1.6.3 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
JWICS is the SCI portion of DISN. Owned and operated by DIA, it provides
DODIIS users a SCI-level high-speed multimedia network using high-capacity
communications to handle data, voice, imagery, and graphics. The system uses JDISS as
its primary means of operator interface and display. "In addition to being a
communications system, JWICS provides secure, interactive video teleconferencing to
the members of the DoD Indications and Warning system at Unified Commands and
service headquarters within the US and overseas. This system enables Indications and
Warning centers to share information with other watch centers throughout DoD"
[14:7.36-37]. It is used to broadcast daily and /or crisis intelligence briefings from any
one site to one or more sites [10:69].
4.1.6.4 Open Source Information System (OSIS)
The Open Source Information System (OSIS) consists of an unclassified group of
systems serving the intelligence community with open source intelligence. Community
Open Source Program Office (COSPO) supports all aspects of open source information
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systems, spanning collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination, to include network
and distributed computing resources. The contents of OSIS includes the Central
Information Reference and Control Database of over 10 million titles on scientific and
technical topics, including patents, standards, military equipment and systems;
Conference Database of upcoming symposia, congresses, and conventions in the areas of
science, technology, engineering, politics, and economics; Digital Terrain Elevation Data
map collection (from NIMA) providing global coverage; Foreign Broadcast Information
Service products including the Daily Reports, Science & Technology Perspectives,
Trends, and Pacific Rim Economic Review; abstracts and complete articles on
telecommunications related topics; and Technical Equipment List indexes with over
100,000 brochures and manuals on telecommunications and related equipment [38].
4.1.6.5 INTELINK
"Intelink, which began testbed operation in 1994, is both an architectural
framework and an integrated intelligence dissemination and collaboration service
providing uniform methods for exchanging intelligence among intelligence providers and
users" [26]. Patterned after the Internet, Intelink provides a global network to allow the
sharing of documents and other resources among numerous intelligence agencies (e.g.
FBI, CIA, DEA, NSA, NRO).
4.1.7 Evaluate
After receiving the intelligence, the user evaluates it to ensure it satisfies the
requirement. A requirement is most often considered satisfied if the "...intelligence
provided to the requestor is complete, timely, and in a usable format" [12:3.2]. If the
intelligence is satisfactory, the user may provide feedback to ensure that the ISR process
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continues to fulfill the user's requirements. If, after evaluation, the user is not satisfied,
the user must convey the dissatisfaction, and part, or all, of the ISR process may have to
be re-accomplished. Dissatisfaction can result from the information being not what was
asked for, not to the degree of resolution needed, or not timely enough to be of use.
Air Force Instruction 14-201 [16:12] gives an example Requirement Satisfaction
report providing areas for evaluation and a rating scale as seen in Table 3.
Table 3. Requirement Satisfaction
Areas for Evaluation

Rating Values (scale from 0-6)

1. Timeliness

0. Totally unacceptable

2. Objectivity

l.Poor

3. Usability

2. Marginal

4. Readiness

3. Fair

5. Completeness

4. Good

6. Accuracy

5. Excellent

7. Relevance

6. Outstanding

4.1.8 Apply
Upon satisfaction of the intelligence received, the final step in the ISR process is
the application of the product. Application can come in many different forms. For nearreal-time collection, intelligence can be applied by a pilot to re-strike a target. Situation
displays providing information to a variety of users can be updated to inform them of
enemy locations. Briefings to decision-makers may also be the result of an ISR product.
Each requirement has its own application, and the ISR product must meet the needs of the
user to ensure application is viable.
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4.2 Summary
The ISR process is a continual, somewhat complicated cycle, vital to military
success. Many organizations, assets, and personnel are involved in making the process
run smoothly and efficiently. The coordination and communication needed among ISR
personnel, warfighters, and decision-makers is essential to ensure the optimal level of
information is provided and is useable. ISR operations will only continue to increase in
importance as information, and information superiority, become more critical elements in
conducting war.
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5. THUNDER Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Methodology

5.1 Introduction
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance is a fairly recent addition to the
THUNDER model. Previous chapters have covered the actual ISR process. This chapter
will demonstrate how THUNDER has implemented ISR in order to capture this process.
THUNDER represents ISR effects using parameters such as processing time, probability
of coverage, and perception, along with modeling various ISR resources such as
satellites, airborne assets, and ground based assets. The THUNDER ISR module is
designed to capture the effects of "...information collection on air planning, sensor and
target performance attributes, requirement for and value of Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA), and processing delay and timeliness of information" [54].

5.2 Levels of ISR
THUNDER has three levels of ISR resolution: Low, High and Very High. The
user specifies each side's ISR level. The names used for the levels of resolution can be
slightly misleading, as they do not in any way indicate the quality of ISR provided. Low
resolution is equivalent to "perfect" intelligence. Essentially, Low resolution does not
show the uncertainty of ISR effects since the side has perfect knowledge of the enemy.
In High and Very High resolutions, decisions are based on perceptions of the truth. The
quality of these perceptions may degrade over time until new observations are made.
The main distinction between High and Very High is in the detail of the
perceptions generated. High resolution maintains perceptions on the enemy's zone/sector
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areas, while Very High maintains perceptions on specific enemy targets. High resolution
intelligence comes from aircraft assets while Very High intelligence also involves
satellites and scripted observations. Scripted observations may represent any intelligence
source desired by the user, such as army ground sensors or HUMINT. The most realistic
scenario entails using Very High resolution, and thus, this study only examines and
explains Very High ISR methodology.
Two THUNDER ISR terms need differentiating: perception and confidence. A
simple example illustrates what these terms mean. When a sensor makes an observation,
a random draw is made for the perception of a target. A confidence level is given by a
user-input default value. The confidence level of a sensor inversely affects the variability
of the perception - the higher the confidence, the less variability from the truth. If a
target has 10 tanks, the random draw may cause the sensor to only perceive 7 tanks.
However, the confidence may be 90% that there are 7 tanks. As time goes on, the
confidence that there are 7 tanks may degrade to, say, 80%. When planning for air-toground strikes, the ATO generator selects sortie allocation and aircraft/munition
configuration by using the highest confidence level for each target attribute among all
sensor observations of the target. A small example of how this works is seen in Table 4.
This methodology is an attempt at fusing data from more than one source of information.
THUNDER uses the data with the highest confidence, even though this perceived data
may, in fact, be incorrect.

63

Table 4. Example of "Fusing" Sensor Reports
Sensor

Target Attribute

Report

Confidence

"A"

Number of tanks

10

90%

"B"

Number of tanks

20

80%

"A"

Velocity

5

75%

"B"

Velocity

15

85%

Used for Planning

Number of tanks

10

Used for Planning

Velocity

15

5.3 ISR Sensors/Platforms
ISR sensors and their capabilities are defined and differentiated through input data
parameters. The parameters that identify each type of sensor include:
-

Real-time or batch sensor delivery. As expected, Real-time indicates that the
sensor can pass intelligence data over a communications link in a real-time
manner. Batch delivery represents sensors that do not disseminate data in a
real-time manner and therefore must physically "deliver" the data before
processing can begin.

-

Processing time. Time to process and analyze raw data is represented by a
probability distribution.

-

Night Capable. Indicates if the sensor is able to gather information at night.

-

Min/Max Sensor Range. Denotes the observation range limitation of the
sensor. Not used for standoff reconnaissance missions.

-

Two Sigma Target Location Error. The sensor will report the location of a
target with this random error.

-

Maximum Number of Targets Per Sorties/Pass. The sensor will observe a
maximum number of the highest priority targets during a pass.

-

Sensor Type (Grid or FLOT). This parameter only has significance for
scripted events. A sensor denoted as "Grid" will only look in the specified
Grid locations; the ISR Grid is defined by the user. A "FLOT" sensor will
scan along the FLOT (Forward Line of Own Troops) given its min/max range.

-

Overfly the Target. Denotes whether the sensor must overfly the target in
order to make an observation.
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-

Observe Through Clouds. Indicates whether cloud coverage will inhibit the
sensor's ability to gather information on a target.

-

Standoff Range. Distance from the target in which a standoff reconnaissance
sensor can make an observation. Only used for standoff sensors.

-

Perception Update Interval. Time between observations for a sensor hovering
over an area or site of interest.

Any aircraft, satellite, or scripted event identified as having an ISR sensor may
collect intelligence data. Aircraft assets typically modeled in THUNDER include JSTARS, AWACS, U-2, and UAV. Any flight group carrying appropriate sensors may
conduct BDA upon execution of an air-to-ground attack. Satellites are described by
orbital parameters that determine when the satellite will be in coverage and the range of
that coverage. Scripted events are usually identified as either Grid or FLOT sensor
events and given a probability distribution to generate times between observations. Grid
sensor events are defined as observations made in certain grid cells of the ISR grid.
FLOT sensor events are observations made within the maximum range of the sensor,
along the FLOT. Aircraft can carry only one ISR sensor whereas satellites or scripted
events may be defined as having more than one sensor. Figure 19 shows the various
types of intelligence platforms that can be used in THUNDER and a sample coverage
area each provides.
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Satellite

FLOT Sensor
Grid Sensor
Figure 19. THUNDER ISR Platforms

5.4 Target Classes
THUNDER groups the targets in a scenario in three different ways for ISR: ISR
target classes, planning classes, and perception classes.
Air-to-ground targets are given an ISR target class which categorizes that target
according to characteristics such as whether it is fixed, mobile, engaged, moving, etc.
Each class has a "Time vs. Probability of Movement Curve" and a "Time vs. 2-Sigma
Location Latency Error Curve." These curves impact whether or not a flight group
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acquires a ground target. Recall, when a sensor observes a target, it already has a 2sigma location error. When a flight group reaches the target area, whether or not the
flight group acquires the target depends on the time since the last observation and curves
defined for the ISR class containing the target. For example, when a sensor gathers data
about a mobile target, it reports a location that has a random error, defined by the sensor,
attached to it. When the flight group reaches the target area, the location it goes to has an
additional error, defined by the target class, since the target has probably moved. See
Figure 20 for graphical depiction.

Target Acquisition

Observation of Target

Aircraft tries to acquire
at this location

Perceived Target Location

Target moves

Error

True Target Location

Perceived location
from satellite
True Tar et
observation
§ Location

Figure 20. Impact of ISR Sensor Target Location Error on Target Acquisition
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Standard targets are also assigned a planning class. Planning classes allow the
user to impact how targets are prioritized for reconnaissance missions as well as
influence nomination rules for air-to-ground attack. Figure 21 shows the process of
prioritizing targets for collection. Targets that are assigned to a particular planning class
have the following similar parameters for target prioritization.
-

Options if BDA has not been accomplished for the target: 1) assume the target
is still live and therefore use the previous perception, 2) assume the target has
been damaged and use a degrade (multiplier also defined for each class), or 3)
assume the target is dead and do not nominate for air-to-ground attack.

-

Distinct priority multipliers for reconnaissance target nomination given that
the target has been nominated for air-to-ground attack, has not been
nominated, and has not been observed since it was last attacked.

-

Minimum priority that the target can be assigned when planning for
reconnaissance/surveillance missions.

-

Confidence level curve that defines the reconnaissance priority multiplier as a
function of the confidence level for the target. For example, one may want to
ensure that we always have 80% for a target, and therefore, if the confidence
is lower than 80%, the priority multiplier will increase the target's priority for
a reconnaissance mission.

Targets are also assigned to an ISR perception class. This defines the
probabilities that a live target is perceived as live. The perception class also defines
default values for the confidence levels when an observation is made of the target, as well
as the confidence degradation curve as a function of time since the observation. The
Probability of Coverage is also defined in this class. The probability of coverage can be
used to represent deception techniques such as targets being camouflaged.
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Apply
Unnominated
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Multiplier

Yes

Apply
BDA
Multiplier

Yes

Apply
Confidence
Level
Multiplier

Use
Minimum
Priority

Yes

No

Assign
Target
Priority for
RECCE
Missions

SREC,
Satellites,
Grid, FLOT
sensors observe
highest priority
targets

Figure 21. THUNDER ISR Target Prioritization

5.5 Intelligence Collection
Only aircraft reconnaissance (RECCE) and standoff reconnaissance (SREC)
missions are automated in the intelligence collection process. The user must preplan any
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other type of collection, such as satellite observations or scripted observations. A
satellite is assumed to always collect observations when the theater is in its view.
Likewise, anything scripted by the user is collected during the scripted times.
A target's priority for a reconnaissance mission is based upon its priority for
strike missions. The strike priority is adjusted using the multipliers in the planning class
(see "Target Classes" above) to determine its reconnaissance priority. Reconnaissance
missions are planned just as strike missions are planned.
Reconnaissance can also be obtained during an air-to-ground attack with aircraft
carrying the appropriate sensors, representing either electronic or human reports. Figure
22 shows the collection process.

5.6 ISR Nodes
ISR nodes are entities in the ISR process that can affect the processing time of an
observation, e.g. a communications center. The ISR sensors are grouped into sensor
classes, and the sensors in a particular class share the same processing delay if ISR nodes
are no longer functioning. They also specify the probability of an observation being lost
if ISR nodes are damaged/destroyed. An example of a sensor's processing rules is shown
in Figure 23. The Rule Sequence checks the status of the ISR Node,
Blue_Comm_Center. If all of the Blue_Comm_Centers have been destroyed, the
processing delay of the observation increases, and a probability that the observation is
lost is also implemented. The processing delay can be adjusted, however, if a Blue
AWACS is still live. The whole ISR observation process is depicted in Figure 24.

70

All other Reconnaissance or
Surveillance Platforms

RECCE/SREC Aircraft

Fly to
target at
ATO
generated
time

Other Aircraft

±

Collect
Intelligence
after
striking a
target
(BDA)

Collect
Intelligence
at the
scripted
times

Collect observations
up to a maximum
number of targets
defined by the user
for each sensor

Figure 22. Intelligence Collection

@Grid and Flot Sensors
10001
BLUE
BEGIN.ISR.PROCESSING.RULE.SEQUENCE
IF COUNT(Blue_Comm_Center) = 0
THEN
LET PROCESSING.DELAY = 2.0 * PROCESSING.DELAY
LET PROB.LOST.OBSERVATION =0.25
ENDIF
IF COUNT(Blue_AWACS) > 0
THEN
LET PROCESSING.DELAY = PROCESSING.DELAY - 0.25
ENDIF
EXIT
END.ISR.PROCESSING.RULE.SEQUENCE

Figure 23. ISR Processing Rules Example
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5.7 Target Perceptions
ISR is used in THUNDER to generate perceptions of true target attributes. These
perceptions affect mission planning and mission effectiveness.
At the time of each sensor observation, random draws are made to
generate a specific target perception with specific levels of confidence for
each of the target attributes (size, location, velocity, etc.). The confidence
levels for that observation are then degraded with the passage of time. At
any point in time, the ISR view of a target will consist of a vector of target
attribute perceptions built by 'fusing' the observations from reporting
sensors. Fusion is modeled by taking, for each attribute, the highest
degraded confidence level across sensors and using that confidence level
to represent the level of perception [51:135].
Each time a sensor makes another observation on a target, its old perception is discarded.
The perceived status of each target includes the following parameters:
- Tons of supplies;
- Force ratio;
- Unit strength;
- Message processing capability;
- Number of spares;
- Numbers of aircraft (by type) at an airbase;
- Usable runway length;
- Locations;
- Velocities;
- Arc throughput;
- Air defense site status;
- Transshipment capacity;
- Logistics facility issue capacity;
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Figure 24. ISR Observation Processing

The perception is only updated after the processing time has passed. The
processing time can be affected by the status of ISR nodes. Generally, as ISR nodes are
degraded, processing time increases. This helps represent decreased bandwidth when an
antenna is destroyed, as well as the extra time needed because of the reduced number of
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analysts deciphering the data. The ISR Processing Rule System also allows for a
probability that an observation is lost, and therefore discarded. The probability of an
observation being lost could model factors such as data not being received, data
saturation of the receiver, or analyst oversight.

5.8 ISR Effects on Mission Planning and Mission Effectiveness
Mission planning entails target nomination, prioritization, sortie allocation, and
aircraft-munition configuration. THUNDER'S air planning function uses target
perceptions when formulating the target list. Nomination rules are set for each ISR target
class. Targets must be nominated to be attacked. An example of this type of rule is, if an
observation has been made of the target within the last 48 hours, then the target is
nominated.
Different types of targets are prioritized using various formulas, but the
parameters in these formulas, such as unit strength, etc., are all based on their perceived
values; therefore, the priorities of targets are based on the perceptions generated by the
ISR sensors.
Once a prioritized target list is generated, aircraft sorties and their missions are
assigned according to the perceived state of the targets. The aircraft/munition
configuration for each sortie is selected based upon the forecasted weather, as well as the
perceived state of the target.
Target acquisition depends on the sensor's target location error and how old the
last observation is, since, for example, mobile targets may have moved. The probability
of acquiring the target depends on the true distance between the aircraft and target. If the
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target exceeds a maximum distance, it is not acquired. However, an aircraft will have
another chance to acquire the target is a standoff reconnaissance aircraft has the target in
its view. The probability that the aircraft will acquire a target in this situation is given by
a user-defined parameter.
Given target acquisition, the effectiveness of a strike depends on the munitions
allocated to the mission. This mission-to-target allocation depends on target perception,
which of course depends on the ISR observations.

5.9 Effects on Ground War
The ground war is deterministic and highly aggregated in THUNDER; individual
battles do not actually occur.
Ground units, usually of division or brigade size for on-line
combat units, engage in combat along the Forward Line of [Own]
Troops (FLOT) and combat is adjudicated by the USA CAA's
Attrition Calibration (ATCAL) model.. .FLOT movement is based
directly on the relative losses of both sides, the postures of the attacker
and defender, and the terrain upon which the combat occurred [10:23].
Ground units in battle engagements move strictly back and forth within battlefield
sectors. The ISR process influences ground battles and the movement of the FLOT
through a multiplier on the lethality of indirect fire weapons and the target availability of
direct fire weapons in equations used by ATCAL. This multiplier is activated whenever
a standoff reconnaissance aircraft has coverage of an enemy unit. The user inputs a
maximum multiplier indexed by weapon, target, and posture. "The actual multiplier is
scaled according to a user input curve that relates SREC aircraft coverage (as a fraction
of the ground combat cycle) to the maximum possible effect" [51:23].
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Figure 25. Attrition Calculation Process
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To understand how this multiplier influences ground combat results and to get a
better idea of its significance, we need to look at the ATCAL process used in THUNDER
to determine battle outcomes. Figure 26 above shows the general process; individual
elements of the process are further explained independently.
The SREC multiplier is computed in the following manner. First, the fraction of
the ground combat cycle that the target was in SREC coverage is determined. Processing
time and probability of an observation being lost are ignored in this calculation. Second,
the user-input maximum multiplier for the appropriate weapon/target/posture
combination is retrieved. The actual multiplier is then given by the following equation.
SREC Multiplier = 1 + [SREC Coverage * (Maximum Multiplier - 1)]

(1)

Prioritizing the targets involves multiplying the probability of kill by its
importance. No SREC effect is seen in this calculation.
For direct fire weapons, the effect of the SREC multiplier is seen in the
availability of targets. It is a direct multiplier on availability, which in turn is used in
computing losses. The procedure for computing losses for direct fire weapons is seen in
Figure 27 where the "Availability" factor represents the availability with the SREC
multiplier applied. Note that "Non-availability of higher priority targets" does not use
this "Availability" factor, nor does the calculation for Shots Fired. We can see that as the
Availability increases, the losses to each target will also increase.
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Figure 27. Computing Losses to Targets of Direct Fire Weapons
Figure 26 shows that the target priorities for indirect fire weapons are weighted.
The number of rounds fired involves the weighted priorities and a bias factor, but that
number is not affected by the SREC multiplier. The SREC multiplier only affects the
lethality of the shooter, which is found in the computation of losses. Losses are
calculated as:
Losses = Rounds fired x Lethality x Adjusted Priority
Note the Adjusted Priority is used to divide the effects of the rounds among the targets
based on priority - it serves the same purpose of target availability for direct fire
weapons.
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(2)

All of the losses are then totaled, and averaged by equipment type. If the
fractional change of each type of equipment is not less than a user-stated 8, re-compute
(essentially, fight the war again for this cycle). Otherwise, assess losses, compute the
consumption, and determine which way each FLOT segment should move.
FLOT movement depends on unit attrition, unit posture, terrain, POL, unit tactical
march rates, and opposing command objectives. The SREC multiplier affects FLOT
movement through the attrition of units.
The influence of ISR on the ground war presented above affects units actually in
combat. ISR also influences reserve units, supplies, or any other support to combat units
by influencing the air war and air interdiction efforts on lines of communication and
resources, as well as targeting equipment and units involved in the ground war.

5.10 Summary
This chapter has presented the parameters and processes used by THUNDER to
capture ISR elements and ISR effects. The parameters represent the uncertainty of
intelligence data. The processes show the compounding effects of ISR by demonstrating
its influence on air targeting and ground unit attrition, which impact mission
effectiveness.
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6. Analysis of the THUNDER ISR Module

6.1 Introduction
THUNDER has an ISR module because of the crucial impact of ISR to
warfighting capabilities. Previous chapters have described the basic components of the
ISR process and the design of the THUNDER ISR module. This chapter compares these
two subjects, real versus modeled, in order to illustrate which ISR components have been
captured, aggregated, or neglected by THUNDER.
Bear in mind that THUNDER is a campaign level model and aggregation of
elements is something that is accepted and necessary in order to maintain reasonable runtimes. So, although some elements of ISR may be identified as missing, or aggregated,
that is not necessarily something undesirable. THUNDER justifiably does not attempt to
model the detail of engagement or mission-level models. However, as technology
advances, it may be possible, and maybe somewhat desirable, to implement more detail
into campaign-level models, even if just for a few processes. Higher resolution processes
allow for more flexibility, and for fewer, or maybe more valid, assumptions. Identifying
the details of a process is a necessary step before an attempt at higher resolution can be
accomplished. Also, knowing which elements of the ISR process have been aggregated,
or dismissed, may allow for higher resolution models to either be identified, or built, in
an effort to generate more accurate input data.
This chapter will present the comparison of the THUNDER ISR process and the
"real" ISR process in an outline similar to chapter 4.
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6.2 Implementation of ISR Purposes
The ISR portion in THUNDER has four basic applications, or purposes, each of
which fit into the fundamental purposes of intelligence identified in Joint Pub 2-0. These
applications are:
-

Aid in aircraft/munition configuration decisions for striking targets

-

Report target status after air strikes (BDA)

-

Assist in real-time target location if strikers cannot locate the target

-

Act as a force multiplier for ground units

Figure 28 maps THUNDER'S ISR applications to the intelligence purposes
identified in Joint Pub 2-0 (see p. 19 for purpose descriptions). Further explanation of the
comparison follows.
Supporting the commander is not necessarily a quantitative concept that can be
reproduced in a model. ISR in THUNDER supports aircraft targeting decisions through
target observations and BDA. Reconnaissance or stand-off reconnaissance missions are
not scheduled by considering any effects on ground troops, although these missions can
be scripted by the user. Knowledge of the situation for any other type of decision, such
as air apportionment, are to some extent pre-set by the user through numerous input files
when designing the scenario.
Identifying and determining objectives is primarily met through user inputs, and
not as a result of process computations. Adherence to warfighting doctrine is
accomplished through user inputs such as the force ratio needed for ground units to
attack, or the strike priorities for targets. General strategic objectives are set before a war

81

THUNDER

Joint Pub 2-0

Automated

Implicit
- Input parameters for
air apportionment and
targeting priorities
- Support through targeting
decisions
- Ensure Ground support
through scripting of SREC
missions
- User identifies targeting
priorities
- User inputs ground attack
objective

■ Aid in aircraft/munition
configuration decisions for
bombing targets
■ Assist in target location real-time if
strikers cannot locate the target
■ Force multiplier for ground units

- Fused report for more accurate
observation

- Ground forces and air
squadrons can appear to
simulate surprise

- Enemy sensor's have "probability
of coverage" allowing Blue targets
to be camouflaged

- User can input rules to
cause aircraft to stop flying

Figure 28. Comparison of ISR Purposes
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Report target status after air strikes
— Battle Damage Assessment

begins and must be induced by the user via the input files. In reality, tactical and
operational objectives are extremely dynamic and stem from the status and circumstances
of the battle learned through ISR efforts. In THUNDER, however, these efforts are not
used in determining objectives for operations.
Identifying enemy centers of gravity is a prime focus of intelligence activities.
However, THUNDER primarily uses ISR to form weapon/aircraft assignments.
THUNDER'S ISR does aid in planning which targets to strike in the air war, and
can also help an aircraft locating a target.
Naval aircraft carriers and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) platforms are
represented in THUNDER, although surface, subsurface, and anti-submarine warfare is
not modeled. Aircraft on the carriers conduct operations just as any other aircraft based
inland along with TLAM strikes.
The ground war is highly aggregated in THUNDER. Unit status and battle results
are calculated deterministically through the ATCAL process. Ground units in battle
engagements move strictly back and forth along pre-defined sectors. Therefore, these
units do not decide where to move, since they always want to move forward. It is
ultimately a question of 'if they move, and which way. The ISR process influences the
movement of units in combat and, therefore, the outcome of battles, by applying a
multiplier to the lethality and target availability factors used in ATCAL equations as
discussed previously. This multiplier is activated whenever a standoff reconnaissance
aircraft has coverage of an enemy unit.
THUNDER'S ground combat involves a myriad of variables including unit
strength, supplies, equipment, lethality, rate of fire, shooter bias, flank degrade, target
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priority, and unit posture. Since the ground war is deterministic, ISR does not really have
an impact on any ground unit planning. It may affect second echelon or reserve type
forces as they may move along a network to carry out their duties. This seems to be a
limited representation of the influence of intelligence on the ground war. In reality,
ground units rely heavily on intelligence. Information about terrain, enemy
reinforcements, second echelon forces, enemy supplies, etc. all influence operational and
tactical decisions. Ground forces base decisions of when, where, and how to attack on
the information they receive from their own reconnaissance equipment, as well as the
intelligence from reconnaissance aircraft and satellites. However, since THUNDER'S
ground war is played deterministically, the implementation of the ISR effect through a
multiplier seems to be a reasonable compromise. Although ISR does not aid in the
planning or execution of operations in a true sense, an impact on battle outcomes can be
realized.
It is interesting to note that although the user can script observations as "Grid" or
"FLOT" sensors to represent ground intelligence collection, these observations do not
impact the ground war, except indirectly through air targeting of the enemy.
Security of operations and countering deception and surprise usually requires
information from more than one source of intelligence since nearly every type of sensor
is vulnerable to some type of deception. Fusing and comparing various sources of
information allows analysts to increase their confidence in what they evaluate as truth.
THUNDER does not compare reports from different sensors in its "fusing" process, but
simply selects the report from the sensor that has the highest confidence level for the

84

target. To obtain a reasonable outcome, the user must carefully assign the right
confidence levels and degradations.
A crucial objective of intelligence collection is to prevent or counter surprise
attacks, but THUNDER does not address this objective at all. Knowing where troops are
massing and how many reinforcements are available builds knowledge of the enemy and
aids in determining enemy intentions. Again, intelligence does not affect on-going
operations of the ground war, but is only considered after the fact when calculating
losses. A possible improvement might be to allow a unit to attack with a lower force
ratio if it is believed the defender's reinforcements are delayed.
Deceiving the enemy and the element of surprise are highly dependent upon the
use of intelligence. Knowing the command and control systems of the enemy and their
intelligence systems facilitates deception. THUNDER'S ATO generator can target these
types of systems, but the ability to plan for surprise is generally lost. However, one way
to accomplish this is through user input. For example, the user can order ground units to
appear at a location at a designated time, but this really has no correlation with the status
of the enemy's intelligence capability. Information superiority is a mission that is
becoming increasingly important in today's world of technology. The ability to disable
or deceive enemy ISR capabilities is vital to accomplishing this mission. THUNDER has
implemented rule language that allows for ISR observations to be lost if certain
structures, such as communication centers, are destroyed. Deception is hard to depict in a
combat model because of the nature of deception activities. Planning for deception and
ensuring that the enemy has not discovered the plan does not fit well with combat
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modeling quantitative limitations. The "probability of coverage" parameter does allow
for a deception effect by not allowing the sensor to always see a target within its view.
The last purpose of ISR is evaluating effects of operations and re-orienting forces
or terminating operations. Evaluating effects of operations is a BDA function. BDA is
usually accomplished by more than one sensor because of the complexity of assessing the
actual damage. BDA starts with aircrew debriefings or cockpit video, but is driven by
imagery. In THUNDER, any aircraft defined with an ISR sensor can do BDA. This can
be used to represent the aircrew report or cockpit video. It is important that the user
configure the confidence of these reports appropriately, as generally they are given a
lower confidence than something like satellite imagery.
In THUNDER, the nomination of a target for re-strike is influenced, through a
priority multiplier, by whether or not BDA has been accomplished. This is a binary
status, and does not take into account the confidence of a BDA report. The user inputs
the perception of a target that has not had BDA accomplished. This tells THUNDER
whether to consider the target live or dead. Targets considered dead are not nominated
for re-strike. Again, only one sensor has to accomplish the BDA in order to trigger this
perception, regardless of the confidence ofthat report. While BDA is performed on three
levels - physical, functional, and system damage, THUNDER has incorporated just the
physical and functional aspects. An ISR observation will report target characteristics,
representing physical damage. The fact that ISR observations influence whether a target
is considered live or dead can be seen as a functional aspect.
The usual termination criteria in THUNDER is a stated number of days of war
completed or the annihilation of one side which leaves no targets to strike. The user may

86

construct "rules" that stop aircraft from flying when a percentage of certain types of
targets are destroyed. Therefore, ISR in THUNDER can influence the termination of
operations through its impact on air targeting and the ability to destroy targets, as well as
the perception it has of targets (live or dead).

6.3 Representation of ISR Principles
As previously stated in Chapter 4, there are numerous principles of ISR identified
by military doctrine. THUNDER has captured some of the principles, while some are
assumed. Again, assumptions are not necessarily inappropriate, as long as they are
known, and can be applied validly. Table 5 summarizes the ISR principles-THUNDER
relationship, with a discussion of each implemented principle following.
Table 5. ISR Principles

V

Principle
Accuracy

V

Timeliness

V

Objectivity
Unity of Effort/Interoperability

V

Relevance
Usability
Completeness
Readiness
Fusion

V

Accessibility
Security
Survivability and Sustainability

V

Comments on THUNDER
Allows for location error and degrading
confidence levels
Incurs processing time, delays, and
probability of observation being lost
Assumed
Cross-cueing essence in locating targets and
ground force multiplier
Assumed
Assumed
Prioritization of targets given by multipliers
Not modeled. Demand-oriented tasking
"Fuses" various sensor information by
choosing the highest confidence level
Assumed
Assumed
Allows for redundancy through scripting
(not through automated scheduling). Allows
for processing delays and lost observations
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Accuracy. This is implemented in THUNDER through the use of confidence
levels, which may decrease over time. Each sensor is assigned a two-sigma location error
applied to its target location estimate. An additional location error is applied at the time
of strike based on the age of the report used for initial location.
Timeliness. Timeliness of ISR reports is based on a sensor's processing time,
which may be a random variable. Processing delays can also be incurred when certain
ISR nodes have been destroyed, as specified by user input. Also, the probability of an
observation being "lost" is factored in when ISR nodes are destroyed (subject to user
input). These processing delays and lost observations are used to represent a variety of
occurrences such as interrupted or lost communications or analyst oversight.
Unity of Effort /Interoperability. The fact that the different military services,
civilian organizations, and allied nations have interoperable systems and are unified in
effort is assumed in THUNDER. One element in THUNDER where this has been
implemented is through cross-cueing. This ability is demonstrated in THUNDER
through the ability to "roll the dice" again if an AWACS (or J-STARS) type of aircraft is
in reach, to aid in target location. The impact of cross-cueing can also be seen by the
increase in lethality and target availability in the ground war.
Completeness. It is assumed that the "Commander" has all available and relevant
information from an ISR observation to accomplish the mission. Prioritization for
obtaining that information is seen through the prioritization of targets for intelligence
collection. Targets are prioritized based on their strike priority, which is then multiplied
by various ISR factors, such as a BDA multiplier.
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Fusion. THUNDER "fuses" observations based on confidence level. This issue
was discussed in Chapter 5.
Survivability and Sustainability. Mostly seen through the role of ISR nodes. As
nodes are destroyed, delay time and probability of lost observation can be increased.
Only ISR sensors attached to aircraft are vulnerable to attack. The user can simulate a
satellite being "moved" or a new satellite being "launched" during the course of the war
by using rules that set the probability of an observation being lost to 1.00 until the sensor
should be used.

6.4 Types of Intelligence
Intelligence comes in different forms. In THUNDER, the user can script
HUMINT and OSINT observations. Because any aircraft can carry a sensor, this sensor
can be considered a HUMINT sensor if it is representing an aircrew debriefing. The type
of intelligence explicitly accounted for in THUNDER is Imagery Intelligence. Analysts
can "trick" the simulation to do other types, but it is laborious, and probably not
desirable. THUNDER 6.6 will be able to model SIGINT. Since HUMINT and OSINT
are scripted inputs, it is sufficient to explicitly model only IMINT and SIGINT;
MASINT and TECHINT are probably not necessary.

6.5 Communications
Communication is a vital part of all military operations, including the ISR
process. SATCOM, telephone, radio, fax, electronic message, etc. are just a few of the
media to transmit information such as requirements, tasking orders, cross-cueing, and to
permit dissemination of ISR. Communication systems and/or C4I systems are not
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explicitly modeled in THUNDER. Some communication problems and their effects are
captured through various input parameters. For instance, a processing delay is incurred if
ISR nodes are damaged or destroyed. Processing delays may decrease if an aircraft such
as an AWACS is in the vicinity. The same rules can apply to the probability of an
observation being lost. An observation may be lost for a variety of reasons such as a
message being jammed or garbled or through saturation of a communications satellite.
The sensor's defined processing time represents the time it takes to process and transmit
the data. All of these parameters are highly aggregated measures, to which it seems
rather difficult to assign "accurate" values. It may be desirable to explicitly model
communications to some extent, or at least at a slightly higher resolution than currently
employed.

6.6 Initial Preparation of the Battlefield
In THUNDER, the Initial Preparation of the Battlefield is represented by a data
file which includes the time since the last observation of each target based on a random
draw and a confidence curve. This in turn translates to the confidence of intelligence data
of targets, i.e. usually the more time that has passed since that last observation, the lower
the confidence level. In reality, the initial assessment entails much more than just target
status and contributes overwhelmingly to the timing of activities and courses of action
considered by the commander. The way that the initial assessment must really be
captured, aside from the data file, is through other inputs by the user. Obviously it is the
user that decides how much is known about the enemy when the campaign begins.
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6.7 ISR Process
So far this chapter has compared the ISR purposes, principles, and other ISR
components in reality with those of THUNDER. The following section will compare the
ISR process.
6.7.1 User Requirement
Although in reality, many factors drive ISR requirements, e.g. technological
capabilities, enemy will, allied and foreign sentiments, and enemy centers of gravity, the
ISR requirements in THUNDER are basically used for aircraft targeting. The air
planning and mission generation processes within THUNDER attempt to model AF
doctrine in that the JFC sets intelligence requirements, which the JFACC fulfills. The air
planner accomplishes this primarily through the generation of target lists, which are then
prioritized for reconnaissance/surveillance missions. The user can impose requirements
through scripting or inputting planning parameters in such a way to obtain a desired
outcome. For example, the air planner does not generate a surveillance mission to fulfill
a requirement for real-time intelligence to aid in target location, but the user can either
script or manipulate certain parameters to ensure that surveillance of targets is
accomplished, thereby modeling the desired effect.
Although in reality ground units rely on intelligence inputs to determine their
courses of action, these units do not generate requirements for intelligence in
THUNDER. As discussed previously, the impact of intelligence on the ground war is
mainly through the intelligence benefits to aircraft which can destroy ground units,
equipment, supplies, etc. Ground units do receive a by-product of surveillance missions
in that having surveillance of enemy units increases the lethality or target availability;
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however, a ground unit cannot "request" this surveillance in THUNDER. Yet once
again, the user can ensure that surveillance takes place through scripting or various other
inputs.
Figure 29 summarizes how the JFC intelligence requirements of each of the
component commanders are represented in THUNDER.

THUNDER

-<

Primary driver of ISR requirements. Employs
reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft through
ATO generation. The user scripts orbital
parameters for space assets that make
observations.
Benefits from air and space reconnaissance and
surveillance, but does not generate requirements.
The user can script observations.
Special Ops not really played in THUNDER.
HUMINT is scripted, but need for HUMINT
does not drive ISR requirements.
Naval warfare not played in THUNDER. The
user can script observations of coastal regions.

Figure 29. User Requirement Representations
6.7.2 Planning and Tasking
Figure 30 shows the Planning and Tasking Process in THUNDER. Figure 31
shows the Planning and Tasking Process during conflict.
THUNDER treats planning for intelligence collection and tasking intelligence
collectors as one process. Actual planning for intelligence collection begins by
prioritizing requests. THUNDER attempts to mimic this aspect by beginning with the
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Figure 30. Planning and Tasking Intelligence Collection in THUNDER
standard target list and each target's strike priority. Standard targets are organized into
ISR target planning classes that define the ISR multipliers to apply to each target's strike
priority and therefore prioritize the target list for reconnaissance and surveillance
(RECCE/SREC) missions. These multipliers allow considerable flexibility
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Prioritize
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dynamic '
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appropriate agencies

Figure 31. ISR Planning in Theater Level Conflict
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Consider
timeliness of
receiving
observation

for the user in planning for RECCE/SREC missions. Multipliers are applied if a target is
not nominated for strike and if BDA has not been accomplished. A third multiplier
allows the user to establish a minimum priority that the target may have for
RECCE/SREC. These, once again, are good planning tools for quantitative items such as
target status. Abstract information such as enemy intentions is something that the user
must somehow manipulate when setting up initial parameters.
The THUNDER planning module lacks coordination between air and space
assets. Air assets given RECCE or SREC missions are scheduled through the ATO
generator. Space assets are planned for automatically through their specified orbital
parameters. Of course, the user can script any other observations desired. The planning
process in THUNDER shows the biggest divergence from reality. Figure 9 (page 39)
shows that many factors are considered when deciding on the sensor/system for
collection. In THUNDER, RECCE/SREC mission sorties are assigned to the
aircraft/sensor combination that has the highest confidence for that particular target.
Sensor capability in regard to weather and range to target are also considered. Aircraft
can be tasked even if a space asset can make a collection, and vice versa. Although this
does allow for possible redundancy, coordination between the two is desired to allow for
maximum coverage of the greatest number of targets. In reality, all types of intelligence
collectors (ground, air, space, and sea) should be considered when planning for
collection.
Another factor to include in planning, related to timeliness, is sensor/system
availability. The ATO generator automatically schedules RECCE/SREC aircraft. When
integrating space assets, coverage times must be considered since the times that a space
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asset can view of a target is relatively fixed. Redundant coverage of some targets may be
desirable, especially when conducting BDA. THUNDER does not schedule missions
specifically based on the need for a redundant observation, but it does not prevent it
either by integrating air, space, and scripted observations.
Tasking for reconnaissance aircraft in THUNDER takes place in the ATO
generator at the same time as the planning. Similarly, satellite tasking is assumed
through the defined orbital parameters. THUNDER assumes that the space assets are
tasked every time they come into view, and perform the task 100% of the time. In reality,
some sensors may not always be able to gather data on certain targets in their footprint
due to various factors such as sun interference or other weather effects. Also, it is not
necessarily a "given" that just because a satellite is overhead that it will be tasked to
make collections.
Another departure from reality in the THUNDER ISR module is the lack of
dynamic re-tasking. As situations change and new information becomes available,
collection priorities may also change. In THUNDER, as with all of the aircraft sorties,
dynamic re-tasking of aircraft is not possible. This is the same for all collections. Once
the planning cycle has determined the RECCE/SREC priorities, these will not change
until the next cycle.
Finally, tasking aircraft and satellites takes time, and relies upon the ability to
communicate. Tasking national assets requires coordination through and with the
appropriate agency. None of the tasking time or coordination is represented in
THUNDER, and probably isn't necessary. The usual Planning Cycle in THUNDER is 12
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hours, where in reality it is 48-72 hours. This extra time should ensure that at 12 hours
out, the tasking has been ordered.
6.7.3 Collection
Collection is scheduled by the ATO generator for RECCE and SREC missions.
Collection times by satellites are given by the orbital parameters of the satellite/overhead.
Any aircraft equipped with a sensor may make observations after a strike. Sensors
defined in THUNDER as "Grid" or "FLOT" sensors can be used to represent groundbased collection. The user must script all other types of collection. Scripting permits the
user to define almost any type of collector. One limitation of THUNDER is that aircraft
can only carry one sensor. In reality this is not the case. For example, a high altitude
UAV, such as Global Hawk, can carry multiple sensors such as electro-optical, infra-red,
and synthetic aperture radar.
Since THUNDER treats carriers as floating airbases, any naval aircraft that
performs surveillance or reconnaissance missions can be modeled and scheduled just as
any other land-based aircraft. However, intelligence of enemy naval assets normally
gathered by naval platforms will not be captured in THUNDER. This has little impact on
the theater level warfighting envisioned by THUNDER since it does not model open
ocean, ship vs. ship warfare.
Army intelligence, or any ground-based intelligence, is not modeled explicitly in
THUNDER. The user can mimic these type of collectors by using "Grid" or "FLOT"
sensors. In reality, Army intelligence gathering capabilities depend to a large extent on
the role of the unit, its proximity to the FLOT, and its status, {i.e., engaged, recuperating,
etc.) Numerous types of equipment can gather intelligence, whether purposely or as an
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important by-product of normal activities. These collections, in turn, aid in Army
operations at both the tactical and operational level.
6.7.4 Analyze
Processing time is captured through random delays and user input. This
also includes analysis time. Analyst error or oversight can be simulated through the
probability that an observation is lost. Again, determining the number to be used for
analysis time and probability of error is not an easy task. When fusing data from many
sources, THUNDER uses the highest confidence level for each target; the confidence
level considers the time since the observation was made. This "fusion" process is fairly
realistic as long as the sensor confidence levels truly reflect the ability of the sensor.
However, as with any model, THUNDER does not capture the human judgment often
involved when human analysts face "special cases" and their experience and knowledge
drive their actual decisions. For example, it is possible that specifications of a target
found in open source material may be more useful than a report gathered by ISR assets,
even though open source is generally considered less reliable. The integration of old data
with new data to make better assessments is also lost in THUNDER. Old data is simply
replaced by new observations. Also, since no other observation is considered, any
dichotomy between sensors will not be realized. For example, if one sensor reports 10
tanks with 80% confidence, and another sensor reports 3 tanks with 75% confidence,
only the 10 tanks will be considered, whereas in reality, the knowledge of another highlyconfident sensor that produces a significantly different report may invoke the need to reobserve the target.
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6.7.5 Dissemination
Dissemination in THUNDER can be represented by the sensor's processing time.
Dissemination can be stopped through the "probability of lost observation" parameter.
6.7.6 Evaluate
In THUNDER, all observations are assumed to be relevant until an observation
with higher confidence is reported, then the old observation is discarded. The end user of
the product is assumed to be satisfied. The feedback loop is not modeled.
6.7.7 Apply
The ISR observations are applied by updating air-to-ground target statuses. Also,
it is applied in its influence on the ground war.

6.8 Summary
This chapter has presented a comparison of the ISR purposes, principles, and
processes involved in the real world and in THUNDER. Overall, THUNDER has
captured most of the critical elements of the ISR process. Some assumptions that
THUNDER makes in regard to ISR are:
- ISR and C4 systems within military services, among military services, among
military and civilian organizations, and among nationalities are all
interoperable.
- Observations are always analyzed objectively, and the same confidence level
is always assigned to a particular sensor
- The observation from the sensor with the highest confidence level is always
considered the best.
- Satellites always make observations whenever the theater is in view.
- Observations always fulfill the user's request.
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- Only sensors attached to aircraft are vulnerable to attack.
Numerous parameters and algorithms are used within THUNDER to represent
ISR. Many THUNDER ISR elements mimic the real world, or at least mimic the effects,
in good fashion. Some of the better qualities of THUNDER'S ISR module include:
- ISR sensors can be distinguished through capability and confidence level
allowing for flexibility and ability to be adapted to a wide variety of scenarios.
- ISR sensors are modeled as real or batch; each has a processing time that can
be adversely affected by the destruction of ISR nodes.
- Aging of ISR observations is taken into account when considering target
nomination, confidence of the report, and target location error.
- ISR observations affect prioritization of targets.
- THUNDER makes an attempt to "fuse" ISR observations.
There are also some limitations to THUNDER'S ISR module. Many of these
limitations come in the interaction between ISR assets and the ground war. This is due in
part to the fact that the ground war is played deterministically, limiting the ability of ISR
to affect ground war decisions. Some of the most significant disadvantages of
THUNDER's ISR module are:
- The ground war has no impact on ISR scheduling. Support of the ground war
does not factor into RECCE/SREC mission scheduling.
- ISR has no impact on ground units' courses of action. Knowledge of enemy
reserves or status of supplies is not considered.
- Grid, FLOT and Space sensors, as well as RECCE missions, do not aid the
ground war.
- ISR collection is not coordinated among satellites, aircraft, and scripted
events, resulting in less than the maximum number of targets being observed.
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- In the target nomination rules, BDA is considered to be accomplished
regardless of the confidence level of the sensor.
- Aircraft can only carry one ISR sensor.
- Dynamic re-tasking of ISR assets is not possible.
Because THUNDER is a campaign-level model, some parameters and process
elements are aggregated to represent numerous possible effects. Some of the elements
aggregated in THUNDER'S ISR module are:
- Processing Time <= Time to gather the intelligence, process it, relay it to the
analyst, analyze the data, and disseminate the information to the user is
aggregated into a randomized processing time.
- Processing Delay and Probability of Lost Observation <= Problems such as
interrupted communications, analyst errors, and the effect of information
overflow are represented by a delay added to the processing time and a
probability that the observation is lost and not used.
- Targeting Decisions <= All user requirements are aggregated into decisions
made about targeting.
- Air Planning Module <= The Planning and Tasking processes for
SREC/RECCE missions, and their coordination among military and civilian
organizations, takes place when the ATO generator schedules the missions.
- Lethality and Target Availability <= All ISR effects on ground units are seen
only in the lethality and target availability factors used for attrition.
Although many ISR elements are represented in THUNDER, many of these rely
on user input. Therefore, the user's knowledge and ability to input and script ISR
parameters and elements correctly is critical to the process, and in effect, to the modeling
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capability of THUNDER itself. Some of the effects that rely upon user input or scripting
are:
-

Overall knowledge of the situation and enemy at the onset for air
apportionment and target priority decisions

-

Sensor capabilities - range, accuracy, confidence, perception of live targets as
live and live targets as dead

-

Impact of BD A on targeting decisions

-

Maximum force multiplier of SREC on ground war

-

Influence on processing time due to ISR nodes being destroyed

-

Representation of ground-based and sea-based sensors through the scripting of
Grid and FLOT sensor events

-

Scripting of units to appear to simulate a surprise attack

-

Launching or moving of satellites during the course of the war

Many of the real world ISR elements and effects are captured through
THUNDER'S automated processes or through user scripting. The next chapter will
verify whether THUNDER'S processes actually show ISR effects in battle outcomes.
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7. Sensitivity Analysis of THUNDER ISR Module

7.1 Purpose
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of THUNDER'S ISR implementation, an
experiment examining the sensitivity of the quality, quantity, and timeliness of ISR
observations on battle outcomes was performed. The purpose of the experiment was to
verify that THUNDER is sensitive to ISR changes so it can validly be used for
comparative analysis of competing ISR systems. For example, when trying to compare
two systems, and one guarantees "faster" intelligence data, it must be established that
THUNDER is sensitive to that difference in order to show the benefit of more timely
intelligence. This experiment does not attempt to "quantify" the value of intelligence by
concluding, for example, that if you have faster intelligence, you kill 1000 tanks versus
700 tanks, but it is merely interested in the fact that more tanks were killed. It is only
these comparisons and sensitivities among ISR capabilities that are evaluated.

7.2 Scenario
A 30-day war using THUNDER'S Middle East (ME) database was used for this
experiment. The ME database is an unclassified scenario distributed with THUNDER in
which the battlefield is oriented to resemble a Desert Storm scenario. One of the
problems with this scenario, however, was the use of the ISR module. The scenario
defaults to using "High" resolution for ISR. Many of the sensors defined in the scenario
are never used, and only one reconnaissance aircraft, RF-4, is defined for the Blue side.
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Because of the need for more reconnaissance aircraft, one squadron each of HighAltitude Endurance UAVs, U-2s, and RC-135s was added. The specifications for the
aircraft were taken from unclassified, open literature sources [22,28,41,48]. Absolute
accuracy of system specifications was not as important as simply having more sensors
available in the scenario.
The Blue side in the ME database is superior to the Red side. To avoid biasing
battle outcomes due to this superiority, Blue capability was reduced and Red capability
was increased. Some Blue squadrons were removed and all other Blue squadrons were
reduced by 20-25%. In order to increase Red's ability and desire to push forward, the
tactical march rate for the Red side was increased by 1000 and the objective of the Red
side was increased from 0 to 1,000,000 meters. Finally, 40% of the Blue squadrons and
65% of Blue ground units were delayed from arriving at the theater anywhere from 1 to 7
days after combat had begun. Table 6 summarizes the modifications made to the ME
database.
Table 6. Changes to ME database

Number of Blue squadrons
Number of Blue aircraft
Number of Blue types of aircraft
Number of Red squadrons
Number of Red aircraft
Red tactical march rate
Red objective
Blue unit/squadron orders

ME Database
51
1144
19
19
454

Modified Database
48
724
22
19
454

0

+1000 for each unit type
1,000,000

None

Some arrive 1-7 days late
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7.3 Design of Experiment
The design of the experiment was a face-centered central composite design
(CCD) with 3 factors - quality, quantity, and timeliness. Central composite designs are
widely used for second-order models. The CCD has three components: factorial points,
axial points, and center runs.
The factorial points represent a variance optimal design for a firstorder model or a first-order + two-factor interaction type model. Center
runs clearly provide information about the existence of curvature in the
system. If curvature is found in the system, the addition of axial points
allows for efficient estimation of the pure quadratic terms [36:298].
A graphical depiction of the face-centered CCD is shown in Figure 32.

High

Timeliness
High
Low

Low
Low

Quality

High
Quantity

Figure 32. Face-centered Central Composite Design
The face-centered CCD was chosen so that the extreme values can be measured
and a response surface can be generated within the bounds of the design space. It is
desirable to include points that are at the extremes as this results in the most attractive
scaled prediction variance [36:313]. The prediction variance will change depending on
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the position in the design space, and it reflects how well the model can predict the
response. The traditional CCD could not be accomplished because the axial point design
settings were infeasible.
As can be seen in Figure 32, the region defined by the face-centered CCD is
cuboidal. The design is not rotatable, which would provide for a constant scaled
prediction variance for any two points the same distance from the design center [36:306].
However, according to Meyers and Montgomery
.. .rotatability or near-rotatability is not an important priority when the
region of interest is clearly cuboidal. Rotatability (or near-rotatability)
is a useful option that comes from spherical or near-spherical designs;
these designs are certainly appropriate for spherical regions of interest
or regions of operability, and they are less appropriate with cuboidal
regions [36:313].
The design matrix for the face-centered CCD is shown in Equation (3), where
each row in the transposed matrix denotes a factor. The top row represents timeliness,
the second row is quantity, and the bottom row signifies quality. A setting of -1
represents the "Low" setting, 1 represents the "High" setting, and 0 represents the center
point.

>

Response =

11-11-11-110 0 0 0-11000000
•1-11

1-1-1110 0-1100000000

•1-1-1-11

1

(3)

11-110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Note that the matrix includes 6 center point replications (seen in the last 6
columns of (3) above). For cuboidal designs, two center runs will suffice to stabilize the
scaled prediction variance [36:313]. However, doing additional center runs allows for
more degrees of freedom when estimating the error [36:113].
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Since THUNDER is a stochastic model, 30 replications were performed at the
first eight design points, which represent the full-factorial portion of the design, and 20
replications were performed at the six axial design points. For the center runs, 4
replications at each center point in the design matrix were completed for a total of 24
replications at the center point. The mean response over all replications was calculated,
and this mean was used in the response vector for the design matrix.
Every run was independent. No attempt was made to correlate the runs at the
various design points due to the large number of stochastic processes in THUNDER.
Synchronization of random numbers in THUNDER is difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve. An attempt to use common random numbers may correlate and synchronize
processes at the start of a run, but this would soon diverge and synchronization would
cease. Banks, Carson, and Nelson suggest that "If synchronization is not possible..., use
independent streams of random numbers..." [3:483].

7.4 Parameters
Table 7 summarizes the parameter settings used corresponding to the facecentered CCD matrix of Equation (3). Each factor - quantity, quality, and timeliness contains parameters within THUNDER varied together for each setting of low, center,
and high. Only the Blue side's parameters were changed for the experiment, Red
capabilities were left untouched.
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Table 7. Parameter Settings for each Factor Level
Factor
Quality

Parameters
Perception (Live as Live)
Two-Sigma Target Location Error
Ground War Multiplier (Lethality and Availability)
SREC Air-to-Ground Update

Timeliness Processing Time
Quantity

Probability In Coverage
Probability of Initial Coverage
Probability of Lost Observation

Low
0.25
5000

Center High
0.5
0.75
2550
100

1.5
.25

2.25
.5

3.0
.75

18

13.5

9

0.25
0.25
0.75

0.5
0.5
0.5

0.75
0.75
0.25

The "Low" setting represents the study's worst ISR capability, with "High" being
the best. "Center" represents the center point. Some preliminary results from an AFSAA
study [52] indicate little difference in some battle outcomes between the absolute
extremes (such as 0 and 1.0) for the above parameters. Therefore, 0.25 and 0.75 are used
as the extremes. The Two-Sigma Target Location Error setting was used in the AFSAA
study as was the Processing Time. The Processing Time was set at 9 and 18 so that the
effect wouldn't just be to shift the effects to the next Air Planning Cycle (the usual Air
Planning Cycle in THUNDER is 12 hours). By choosing 9 as the "High" setting, any
observation taken before hour 3 of the Cycle is available for planning the next Cycle.
Anything taken after hour 3 is not available until the next Cycle has already been planned
(Figure 33a). By choosing 18 as the "Low" setting, nothing is available for the next
Planning Cycle, but if the observation is made before hour 6, it is available to plan for the
third Planning Cycle. Anything after hour 6 is not available until the fourth Planning
Cycle (Figure 33b). Choosing these settings adds randomness in that the availability may
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be similar at both settings, or it may be two Cycles apart, but it will not just shift the
planning over a cycle.

Observation

+. Used for Planning

Observation— ► Used for Planning

I

1

0

12
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36

Planning Cycle 3

Planning Cycle 1
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Observation

p. Used for Planning

Observation-

-► Used for Planning

I

1

0

24

12

48

36

Planning Cycle 3

Planning Cycle 1

Planning Cycle 4

Planning Cycle2
b) Processing Time set to 18

Figure 33. Processing Time Parameters Impact on Air Planning Cycle
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7.5 Measures of Outcome (M 00)/Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
Five MOO/MOEs were chosen corresponding to battle outcomes expected to
demonstrate sensitivity to ISR capabilities. These measures are:
-

Total Red ground equipment killed. Equipment includes tanks, infantry
vehicles, armored personnel carriers, trucks, and artillery.

-

Red equipment killed in ground battle.

-

Red equipment killed by air missions.

-

Air Loss Exchange Ratio: Ratio of Red air losses to Blue air losses. Air
Losses include air-to-air losses, surface-to-air losses, and aircraft lost on the
ground.

-

Percentage of Red strategic targets killed. Strategic targets include Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical (NBC) facilities, communication centers, command
bunkers, refineries, power plants, and air defense radars.

7.6 Statistical Analysis Methods
To illustrate the responsiveness of THUNDER to ISR input parameters, a
combination of statistical methods was used based upon least squares linear regression
and determining the difference between two means.
7.6.1 Least Squares Linear Regression
Linear regression involves using independent predictor variables to estimate a
model, or function, that can be used to predict a response. A first-order model is
represented by the following equation:
y = ßo + ßiXi + ß2x2+... + ßkXk + s

(4)

where y is the response variable, x; are the independent variables (or factors), ßi are the
regression coefficients which represent the expected change in response y per unit change
in Xj when all remaining independent variables Xj (tej) are held constant, s is the error
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term which is assumed to be independent and identically normally distributed with a
mean of zero and constant variance.
The term "linear" regression is used because the model is linear in the parameters
of ßj. Often, first order models (first order referring to the independent x variables) are
not adequate in representing the model relationships. If curvature exists or interaction
terms are significant, second order models must be used. This study uses second order
models to fit the responses. An example of a second order model is shown below:
y = ßo + ßixi + ß2x2 + ßiixj2 + ß22x22 + ßi2xix2 + E

(5)

The method of least squares calculates the ß's such that the sum of the squares of
the errors, s's, are minimized. An error is the difference between the observed value and
the corresponding value predicted by the fitted model.
7.6.2 Testing for Significance of Individual Regression Coefficients
Variables that are not important to the model can cause the mean square error to
increase and therefore decrease the usefulness of the model [36:31]. To ensure that only
significant variables are included, a t-test is used. The null hypothesis is H0: ßj = 0, with
the alternative of HA: ßj * 0. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the coefficient, ßj, for
the Xj variable is not significant, and Xj is removed from the model. The test statistic is
given by
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where b] is the estimate of ßj, and Cy is the diagonal element of (X'X)"1 corresponding to
bj, where X represents the matrix of independent x variables. The null hypothesis is
rejected if |to| > to/2,n-k-i, where n is sample size and k is the number of independent
variables. The t-test was used in this study during the "screening" phase to determine
which variables to include in the model. A p-value was computed to determine whether
or not to accept or reject the null hypothesis. A p-value is the smallest value of a for
which the null hypothesis can be rejected [35:432]. For this study, a variable with a pvalue of greater than 0.10 was considered insignificant.
7.6.3 Testing for Significance of Regression
Testing for significance of regression determines whether any of the ßj
coefficients are significant. The null hypothesis is H0: ßi = ß2 = • • • = ßk = 0, with an
alternative of Ha: Not all ß; equal zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis implies that at least
one of the independent variables is significant to the model. The test statistic is
r_
0

SSR/k
_MSR
SSE/(n-k-l) MSE

(?)

where SSR is the sum of squares due to the model (or regression) and SSE is the sum of
squares due to the residual (or error). The formulas for these estimates are

f-

V

SSR=b'X'y-^-^-

(8)

SSE=y'y-b'X'y

(9)
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Ho is rejected if F0 > Fa, k, n-k-i• A p-value is computed for this test statistic to
determine whether or not the model is significant. In this study, the model was
considered significant if the p-value is less than 0.05.
The coefficient of multiple determination, R2, is another estimate that implies the
appropriateness of the model. R2 is the measure of the amount of reduction in the
variability of the response obtained from the independent variables used [36:30].
i?2 =—®i*—

(io)

However, adding an independent variable will always increase R2, so a better measure is
given by an adjusted R2, which does not always increase with the addition of a variable.
SSEKn-p)
(SSR+SSE)/(n-l)

(n)

where p is the number of ßi's. Higher R2adj values indicate a better fit to the data.
To verify that model assumptions are not violated, residual analysis is performed.
This involves verifying that the error terms, Sj's, are independent and identically normally
distributed with mean zero and constant variance. For this study, a scatter plot of the
residuals against the predicted vales was used to visually verify independence and
constant variance. The Shapiro Wilk test was used to verify normality. The null
hypothesis of the test is that the distribution is normal. For this study, residuals with a pvalue of less than 0.05 were considered non-normal.
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7.6.4 Testing for Significant Differences in Mean/Median Response
Ninety-percent confidence intervals were constructed between each of the first
eight design points to test for differences in mean/median response. For design points
that had normally distributed data, 90% two-sample-t confidence intervals, assuming
unequal variances, were constructed. Law and Kelton [33:319] state that constructing
confidence intervals to test for differences in mean response is preferable to testing the
hypothesis that the mean responses are equal for the following two reasons:
1. Since the model is only an approximation to the system, (the
hypothesis) will clearly be false in almost all cases [33:319].
2. A confidence interval provides more information than the
corresponding hypothesis test. If the hypothesis test indicates
that (the means are not equal), then the confidence interval will
provide this information and also give an indication of the
magnitude by which (the mean of the first system) differs from
(the mean of the second system) [33:319].
Because the replications between design points were independent, and equal variances
could not be assumed, the two-sample-t confidence interval first introduced by Welch in
1938 was used [33:589]. The confidence intervals were formed in the following manner.
Let Xi and X2 be the average of the responses for two design points, and Xy and X2J be
the j* response in the corresponding design point. Calculate the following equations:
^

(12)

X, = Z X,
30

,

r

XL*»-*/]2

(i3)

2

S i = ^

29

for i=l,2. Degrees of freedom are estimated as:

114

[s2i /30+S22 /30]2

(14)

[s2i /30]2 /29 + [^22 /30f /29
The 90% confidence interval is given by:

X

x +/

(15)

^-+^

The "f' value was rounded down to the nearest integer to find the t-value. There
is a significant difference in mean response between design points if the confidence
interval does not contain zero.
For the design points that did not have normally distributed data, a non-parametric
test based on the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test (also called the Mann-Whitney test) was used
to construct the 90% confidence intervals for difference in median response. This nonparametric test does not assume normality of the data. The assumptions that must be met
are:
1. Both samples are random samples from their respective populations
[6:216].
2. In addition to independence within each sample, there is mutual
independence between the two samples [6:216].
3. The measurement scale is at least ordinal [6:216].
The procedure for calculating a 90% confidence interval for difference in
the median is as follows. Obtain ordered values, U(1) < ... < U(mn) of Xu - X2j for
i=l.. .m and j=l... .n, with m and n being the sample sizes. The lower bound for
the 90% confidence interval is U(C), and the upper bound is u(mn+1"Q. For a 90%
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confidence interval, C can be approximated [25:79] by

C

.9 ~~Z

Z

(.05)

mn(m + n +1)
12

1/2

(16)

A significant difference in median response between design points is concluded if
the confidence interval does not contain zero.

7.7 Results
For each MOO/MOE, a screening experiment was performed to determine
significant variables to include in the model. The t-test for significant coefficents was
used, as well as a graphical look at the influence of quality, quantity, and timeliness. The
model was then constructed and verified with the F-test for linear significance. All
models proposed in this study passed the model assumptions for the residuals. The
model yields a response function that was used to form a surface plot. For each
MOO/MOE, three surfaces plots are shown, each corresponding to timeliness set at either
the low, center, or high level; Air Loss Exchange Ratio has quality at the various settings.
Each surface has quantity and quality plotted on the two horizontal axes, with the
response of the MOO/MOE on the z-axis; Air Loss Exchange Ratio has quantity and
timeliness plotted on the axes. Twenty-five coordinates, corresponding to quantity and
quality set at -1, -0.5, 0, .5, and 1 were used to construct the surface plots; the rest of the
points were interpolated by Mathcad software. Finally, a table indicating differences in
mean/median response among the first eight design points is shown. The 90%
confidence intervals for each MOO/MOE can be found in Appendix B.
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Table 8 shows the results of the experiments for each design point and each
MOO/MOE. Analysis of each MOO/MOE follows.
Table 8. Design Matrix and Mean Responses for each MOO/MOE
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7.7.1 Total Red Equipment Killed
7.7.1.1 Screening Experiment
Table 9 and Figure 34 summarize the results of the screening experiment for Total
Red Equipment Killed. Significant factors are indicated by a Prob > |t| of less than 0.10
in Table 9. Figure 34 graphically shows the relative sensitivity of the main factors. For
this MOO/MOE, the significant factors are Quality, Quantity, Timeliness and Quality2.
Table 9. Screening Fit for Total Red Equipment Killed
Term
Intercept
Quality
Quantity
Timeliness
Quality*Quality
Quantity* Quality
Quantity* Quantity
Timeliness*Quality
Timeliness* Quantity
Timeliness*Timeliness

Parameter Estimates
StdErr
Estimate

t Ratio

7853.230

17.753

442.37

479.211
57.484
41.679
-123.001
17.180
-29.626
31.614
-8.714
-52.001

16.330
16.330
16.330
31.140
18.258
31.140
18.258
18.258
31.140

29.35
3.52
2.55
-3.95
0.94
-0.95
1.73
-0.48
-1.67

Prob > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
0.0055
0.0288
0.0027
0.3689
0.3638
0.114
0.6434
0.1259

8269.7 -

^

7853.23 ■
13
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Figure 34. Total Red Equipment Killed Prediction Profile
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7.7.1.2 Model
The response model is:
y = 7836.905 + 479.211 x Quality + 57.484 x Quantity +

(17)

41.679 x Timeliness -171.978 x Quality2

The model parameter estimates are shown in Table 10.
Table 10. Total Red Equipment Killed Model Parameter Estimates

Term
Intercept
Quality
Quantity
Timeliness
Quality* Quality

Parameter Estimates
StdErr
Estimate

t Ratio

7836.905

18.760

417.75

479.211
57.484
41.679
-171.978

18.760
18.760
18.760
26.531

25.54
3.06
2.22
-6.48

Prob > |t|
<.ÖÖÖ1
<.0001
0.0079
0.0421
<.0001

The R2Adj for the model is high (Table 11), and the model is significant (Table
12).
Table 11. Total Red Equipment Model Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.97928
0.97375
59.3242
7750.92

20

Table 12. Total Red Equipment Killed Analysis ofVariance
Source
Model
Error
C Total

T3F"
15
19

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Ratio

2494727.5

623682

177.215

52790.4
2547517.9

3519

Prob>F
<.0001
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7.7.1.3 Response Surface
The response surfaces for Total Red Equipment Killed are seen in Figure 35.
These indicate that Total Red Equipment Killed is very sensitive to the Quality factor.
As Quality increases, there are relatively large increases in Total Red Equipment killed.
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Timeliness = -1

—8000

—8000
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—7500
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Low

Low

Quality
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Figure 35. Response Surfaces for Total Red Equipment Killed Model
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The Quantity factor plays a slight role in increasing the number of equipment killed as it
moves to the "high" setting. Timeliness has even less of an effect than Quantity.
7.7.1.4 Significant Differences
Table 13 indicates significant differences in mean/median response among the
first eight design points. Since the table is symmetric, only the upper half has been filled.
Referring back to Equation (3), Design Points 1-4 have Quality set at "low", and Design
Points 5-8 have Quality set at "high". Whenever Quality changes from "low" to "high",
there is a significant difference, as is evidenced by the upper right 16 blocks.

Within

Design Points 1-4, there is a difference when Quality changes. Within Design Points 5-8,
differences mainly exist with Design Point 8. Referring to Appendix B, we see that the
differences within Design Points 1-4 and 5-8 are an order of magnitude lower than the
differences between the groups. This indicates, and confirms, that Quality is the most
important factor for Total Red Equipment Killed.
Table 13. Significant Differences in Total Red Equipment Killed

T

B

= Significant Difference
=No Significant Difference
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7.7.2 Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
7.7.2.1 Screening Experiment
The screening experiment for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle, shown in
Table 14 and Figure 36, calculated the significant factors to be Quality, Quantity,
Timeliness, Quality2, Quantity*Quality, and Timeliness*Quality. Note that Timeliness
was not significant by itself, but was included because the interaction term,
Timeliness* Quality, was significant.
Table 14. Screening Fit for Red Equipment Bulled in Ground Battle
Term
Intercept
Quality
Quantity
Timeliness
Quality*Quality
Quantity*Quality
Quantity* Quantity
Timeliness*Quality
Timeliness* Quantity
Timeliness* Timeliness

7399.7 ■
2

"O

O

Parameter Estimates
StdErr
Estimate

t Ratio

6960.708

27.643

251.81

524.183
-52.157
22.503
-268.394
66.663
60.606
54.996
-36.063
-25.894

25.428
25.428
25.428
48.489
28.429
48.489
28.429
28.429
48.489

20.61
-2.05
0.88
-5.54
2.34
1.25
1.93
-1.27
-0.53

<*±

6960.708 ■

i=*.

-*-*■

Prob > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
0.0674
0.3969
0.0002
0.041
0.2398
0.0818
0.2334
0.605

\ i " * I

6085.3 -

7
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Quality

0
Quantity
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0
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Figure 36. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Prediction Profile
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7.7.2.2 Model
The response model is:
y - 6967.65 + 524.183 x Quality - 52.157 x Quantity + 22.503 x Timeliness
- 247.567 x Quality2 + 66.663 x Quality x Quantity

(18)

+ 54.996 x Quality x Timeliness

The model parameters are shown in Table 15.
Table 15. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Parameter Estimates

Term
Intercept
Quality
Quality* Quality
Quantity
Timeliness
Quality* Quantity
Quality* Timeliness

Parameter Estimates
StdErr
Estimate

t Ratio

6967.650

25.600

272.1«

524.183
-247.567
-52.157
22.503
66.663
54.996

25.600
36.204
25.600
25.600
28.621
28.621

20.48
-6.84
-2.04
0.88
2.33
1.92

Prob > |t|
<.ÖÖÖ1
<0001
<.0001
0.0625
0.3953
0.0366
0.0769

The R2Adj (Table 16) is high, and the model is significant as seen in Table 17.
Table 16. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Model Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.97364
0.96147
80.9536
6843.87

20

Table 17. Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C Total

T5F
~6~
13
19

Sum of Squares
3146142.6
85195.3
3231337.9
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Mean Square

524357
6553

F Ratio
80.0119
Prob>F
<.0001

7.7.2.3 Response Surface
The response surfaces for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle are shown in
Figure 37. The Quality factor is again the most influential on the model response, with
Quantity at a distant second. When Quality is set at "low", Equipment Killed actually
decreases slightly as Quantity increases.
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Figure 37. Response Surfaces for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle Model
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7.7.2.4 Significant Differences
Table 18 indicates if there is a significant difference in mean/median response
among the first eight design points. Again, there are always differences when Quality
moves from "low" to "high". No differences exist when only Timeliness changes.
Table 18. Significant Differences in Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
Design Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

12

H

3

4

5

6

7

8

= Significant Difference
=No Significant Difference

7.7.3 Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
7.7.3.1 Screening Experiment
The following factors are significant for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
as shown in Table 19 and Figure 38: Quality, Quantity, Timeliness, Quality2, Quantity2,
and Quantity * Quality.
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Table 19. Screening Fit for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Parameter Estimates
Estimate Std Err
Term
914.920 12.499
Intercept
-87.150 11.497
Quality
124.880 11.497
Quantity
11.497
31.505
Timeliness
70.650 21.924
Quality* Quality
-25.731 12.854
Quantity* Quality
-48.850 21.924
Quantity* Quantity
12.854
-2.394
Timeliness* Quality
12.854
1.556
Timeliness* Quantity
21.924
-18.375
Timeliness* Timeliness

t Ratio

73.2
-7.58
10.86
2.74
3.22
-2
-2.23
-0.19
0.12
-0.84

Prob > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0208
0.0091
0.0732
0.05
0.856
0.906
0.4215

1164.2 -|
914.92
Q.
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Figure 38. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Prediction Profile
7.7.3.2 Model
The response model is:
y = 912.623 - 87.150 x Quality +124.880 x Quantity + 31.505 x Timeliness
+ 63.759x Quality2 - 55.741 x Quantity2 - 25.731 x Quantity x Quality
The model parameter estimates are summarized in Table 20.
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(19)

Table 20. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates
Estimate Std Err
Term
912.623 11.090
Intercept
10.456
-87.150
Quality
124.880 10.456
Quantity
10.456
31.505
Timeliness
18.484
63.759
Quality* Quality
11.690
-25.731
Quantity* Quality
18.484
-55.741
Quantity* Quantity

t Ratio
82.29
-8.34
11.94
3.01
3.45
-2.2
-3.02

Prob > |t|
<.ÖÖÖ1
<.0001
<.0001
0.01
0.0043
0.0464
0.0099

The R2Adj is fairly high for this model as seen in Table 21. The model is
significant as can be seen in Table 22.
Table 21. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Model Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.94848
0.92471
33.0644
916.633

20

Table 22. Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C Total

DF

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

F Ratio

~6~

261661.25

43610.2

39.8902

13
19

14212.33
275873.58

1093.3

Prob>F
<.0001

7.7.3.3 Response Surface
The response surfaces for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions are seen in
Figure 39. Unlike previous models, Quantity has the biggest effect on the responses,
with Quality also causing changes. Timelines has a small impact as evidenced by the
surface shifting down when it is set to "low".
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■Figure 39. Response Surfaces for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions

7.7.3.4 Significant Differences
Table 23 indicates if there is a significant difference in mean/median response
among the first eight design points. Design Point pairs 3 & 4 , and 5 & 6 differ only by
Timeliness. This MOE has the most significant differences among the Design Points.
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Table 23. Significant Differences in Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Design Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

12

3

4

5

6

7

8

^^^M

H

Significant Difference
=No Significant Difference

7.7.4 Air Loss Exchange Ratio
7.7.4.1 Screening Experiment
Table 24 and Figure 40 summarize the significant factors for Air Loss Exchange
Ratio found through the screening experiment to be Quantity, Timeliness, Quantity , and
Timeliness2. Timeliness was included because Timeliness2 was significant.
Table 24. Screening Fit for Air Loss Exchange Ratio
Parameter Estimates
Estimate StdErr
Term
Ö.Ö26
1.620
Intercept
0.024
-0.016
Quality
0.024
0.173
Quantity
0.024
-0.010
Timeliness
0.045
-0.029
Quality* Quality
0.026
-0.014
Quantity*Quality
0.045
-0.122
Quantity*Quantity
0.026
-0.001
Timeliness* Quality
0.026
0.016
Timeliness* Quantity
0.045
-0.081
Timeliness*Timeliness
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t Ratio
63.06
-0.67
7.3
-0.42
-0.64
-0.54
-2.71
-0.05
0.61
-1.8

Prob > |t|
<.0001
0.5156
<.0001
0.68
0.5372
0.6016
0.0221
0.9625
0.5529
0.1014
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|
on
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Timeliness

Figure 40. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Prediction Profile
7.7.4.2 Model
The response model is:
y = 1.617 + 0.173 x Quantity -O.OlOx Timeliness - 0.133 x Quantity2
2

-0.092 x Timeliness

The model parameters are shown in Table 25.
Table 25. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates
Estimate Std Err
Term
1.617 0.02198
Intercept
0.02072
0.173
Quantity
-0.010 0.02072
Timeliness
-0.133 0.03663
Quantity* Quantity
-0.092 0.03663
Timeliness*Timeliness

t Ratio
73.55
8.33
-0.48
-3.62
-2.51

Prob > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
0.6351
0.0025
0.0238

The R2Adj (Table 26) is fairly high, and the model is significant (Table 27).
Table 26. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)
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Ö.88646
0.85618
0.06553
1.50412
20

(20)

Table 27. Air Loss Exchange Ratio Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C Total

"DF
15
19

Sum of Squares
U30l
0.064
0.567

Mean Square

uns—
0.004

Ratio

29.2767
Prob>F
<.0001

7.7.4.3 Response Surface
The response surfaces for the Air Loss Exchange Ratio are seen in Figure 41.
Note that the axes are Quantity and Timeliness since Quality is not in the model.
Quantity has the largest effect on the response. The highest response is when Timeliness
is near the "Center". Quality has no effect.
7.7.4.4 Significant Differences
Table 28 indicates if there is a significant difference in mean/median response
among the first eight design points. This MOE has the fewest number of significant
differences among Design Points. In fact, except for the pair 3 & 8, the only significant
differences are present when Quantity is different between the Design Points. Referring
to Appendix B, the difference between 3 & 8 is barely significant, with a lower bound at
0.02.
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Quality= 0
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Quantity
Low Low

Timeliness
Quality= 1

Quality—1

High

High

Quantity

Quantity
Low Low

Low Low

Timeliness

Timeliness

Figure 41. Response Surfaces for Air Loss Exchange Ratio Model
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Table 28. Significant Differences in Air Loss Exchange Ratio

T

B

= Significant Difference
No Significant Difference

7.7.5 Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
7.7.5.1 Screening Experiment
The significant factors for the Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed are
Quality, Quantity, and Quality2 (shown in Table 29 and Figure 42).
Table 29. Screening Fit for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
Parameter Estimates
Estimate StdErr
Term
0.008
0.863
Intercept
0.008
0.056
Quality
0.008
0.036
Quantity
0.008
0.002
Timeliness
0.015
-0.082
Quality* Quality
0.009
-0.007
Quantity* Quality
0.015
0.006
Quantity*Quantity
0.009
-0.001
Timeliness* Quality
0.009
0.001
Timeliness* Quantity
0.015
-0.006
Timeliness*Timeliness
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t Ratio
103.06
7.21
4.64
0.21
-5.61
-0.87
0.42
-0.11
0.11
-0.4

Prob > |t|
<.0001
<.0001
0.0009
0.8358
0.0002
0.4049
0.6814
0.9182
0.9122
0.6973
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Figure 42. Percentage of Strategic Targets Killed Prediction Profile
7.7.5.2 Model
The response model is:
y = 0.864 + 0.056 x Quality + 0.036 x Quantity - 0.082 x Quality2

(21)

The model parameter estimates are shown in Table 30.
Table 30. Percentage of Strategic Targets Killed Model Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
Quality
Quality* Quality
Quantity

Parameter Estimates
Estimate Std Err t Ratio Prob > |t|
134.69 <.0001
0.006
0.864
<.0001
8.67
0.006
0.056
<.0001
-9.08
0.009
-0.082
<.0001
5.58
0.006
0.036

The R2Adj (Table 31) is fairly high, and the model is significant as seen in Table
32.
Table 31. Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Model Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
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0.92182
0.90717
0.02027
0.82236

Table 32. Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Analysis of Variance
Source
Model
Error
C Total

T3F

Sum of Squares

16
19

0.007
0.084

Mean Square
"0U2T
0.000

F Ratio
62.8883
Prob>F
<.0001

7.7.5.3 Response Surface
The response surfaces for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed are seen in
Figure 43. Quality has the largest effect, although Quantity also causes a change in
response.
7.7.5.4 Significant Differences
Table 33 indicates if there are significant differences in mean/median response
among the first eight design points. Since Timeliness has no impact, there are no
significant differences when only Timeliness is changed. This is evidenced in Design
Point pairs 1 & 2, 3 & 4, 5 & 6, and 7 & 8.
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Timeliness = 0

—0.9
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Low

Quality

Timeliness = 1
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—0.9
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-0.7

High
Low
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Quantity
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Quality
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Figure 43. Response Surfaces for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed Model
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Table 33. Significant Differences in Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
Design Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

12

3

:
:

4

5

6

7

8

Significant Difference
No Significant Difference

7.8 Summary and Conclusion
Table 34 summarizes which variables were considered significant in each of the
MOO/MOEs, as well as which of the three main factors - Quality, Quantity, or
Timeliness - was the most influential. Quality and Quantity had the most influence on
the selected MOO/MOEs. Timeliness did not play a very significant role. This is not
overly surprising since Timeliness is represented by only one parameter, and if
observations are delayed, it is at most for two planning cycles.
Table 35 summarizes the significant differences in mean/median response among
the first eight design points. The number in each square is the number of times the two
design points were significantly different, across the five MOO/MOEs. From this table
we see that Design Point pairs land 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8 were rarely
significantly different in response. Referring back to the design matrix in Equation (3),
these pairs only differ in the Timeliness parameter, again confirming that Timeliness did
not play a significant role in battle outcomes.
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Table 34. Summary of Significant Factors Over All MOO/MOEs

Quality
Quantity
Timeliness
Quality* Quality
Quantity* Quality
Quantity*Quantity
Timeliness*Quality
Timeliness*Quantity
Timeliness*Timeliness

XXX

x

X

X
X
X
X

XXX

XXX

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X

% Strat Tgts
Killed

Air Loss
Exchange Ratio

XXX

Equipment Killed
by Air

Equipment Killed
by Ground

Parameters

Equipment Killed

MOO/MOEs

XXX

X
X

X
X

X = Included in the Model
XXX = Most Influential among Quality, Quantity, Timeliness
Table 35. Summary of Significant Differences in Mean/Median Response
Desiga Point
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

2

3

^^■(_1

4
4

1

4
5
5
0

5
4
4
4

4

7

6
4
4
5

5
4
4

4
0

4
3
4

8
5
5
5
4
4
5

2

Based on the results shown in this chapter, the battle outcomes are responsive to
changes in the ISR parameters in THUNDER, with Quality and Quantity parameters
causing the most responsiveness. This confirms that THUNDER can be used as a tool
for comparative analysis between competing ISR systems.
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8. Conclusions and Recommendations

8.1 Validation Assessment of THUNDER'S ISR Module
THUNDER is a vital tool for Air Force acquisition and operational planning
decisions. With the ever-increasing impact of intelligence on information superiority and
battlefield success, THUNDER must represent the ISR aspect of combat with a high
degree of fidelity. To neglect this aspect of THUNDER would result in inaccurate
assessments and false assumptions about ISR systems and their ability to influence
combat outcomes.
The comparison between the real world process and THUNDER'S ISR process
presented in this study indicates that THUNDER'S ISR module has implemented the ISR
process with a considerable degree of fidelity, although improvements can be made.
Although the processes do involve some aggregation and rely heavily on user input, they
do reasonably represent the real world processes, especially in regard to the air war.
THUNDER does not capture abstract information and the human decision-making
process. It focuses more on winning the battle instead of winning the war. Strategic uses
of ISR such as deciding when to strike and where to attack are lost. It is possible to
artificially capture some of these aspects through user input, but that makes the already
user-intensive input process even more laborious, and somewhat defeats the purpose of
having a model to enact the process. These elements are often neglected in campaignlevel models, and although they are extremely important issues in the real world, they are
not a major degradation of the validity of THUNDER'S ISR module.
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The experiment performed in this study demonstrated that the battle outcomes of
THUNDER reflect the importance of ISR capabilities through their responsiveness to
differences in the quality, quantity, and timeliness of ISR. This validates THUNDER'S
use for comparative analysis between competing ISR systems. It also demonstrates the
compounding effects of ISR in THUNDER. Poor ISR results in poor prioritization of
targets and poor aircraft/munition selection, which results in low mission effectiveness.
Low mission effectiveness results in fewer targets being hit, more missions needed, more
Blue targets being hit, more aircraft endangered, etc. Because THUNDER reflects these
compounding effects, it is that much more important that the processes implemented in
THUNDER closely represent the real world process.
The importance of user input in THUNDER cannot be overemphasized. The real
flexibility, and some of the resulting validity, of the ISR module comes from the fact that
the user can script or influence so many different aspects to capture ISR effects. The
capabilities of the sensors, the degradations of their observations over time, and the target
prioritization rules must be carefully input as the confidence levels and perception levels
of the sensors, and the rules set for target nomination, greatly influence the perceptions of
targets and targeting decisions.

8.2 Recommendations
Improvements are possible to increase the precision of THUNDER'S ISR module.
The goal of improving THUNDER'S ISR module is not to make it an explicit, high
resolution module, but the following suggestions should help to improve the fidelity of

140

the model bearing in mind the purpose of campaign-level models. Recommendations for
improvement are:
-

Coordinate among air, satellite, and scripted events to avoid unnecessary
redundancy and/or to ensure desired redundancy.
~ Planning must consider availability of assets.

-

Aid in determining ground unit posture through adjustment on force ratio.
Allow unit to attack, or not to attack, based on perception of enemy's support
status.

-

Adjust fusion algorithm to incorporate previous knowledge and other
observations available.

-

Consider the confidence level of the sensor performing BD A for the target
perception and target nomination rules.

-

Allow Grid and FLOT sensors to impact the ground war.

-

Allow aircraft to carry more than one sensor. Also, more than one sensor can
be available for all ISR assets with the best one or two selected depending on
target type.

A final recommendation is to ensure that the results found in the experiment
conducted in this study are consistent with results that would be found using classified, or
more realistic data.

8.3 Final Thought
THUNDER'S ISR module is definitely a useful and necessary element. The ISR
module has evolved over the past few years and is continually being improved. The
recommendations presented above will only enhance THUNDER'S utility and capability
beyond that which it has already.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Acronyms

ACC
AF
AFSAA
AFSATCOM
AS AS
ATARS
ATCAL
ATO
AUV
AWACS

Air Combat Command
Air Force
Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency
Air Force Satellite Communications
All-Source Analysis System
Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance Systems
Attrition Calibration
Air Tasking Order
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles
Airborne Warning and Control System

BAI
BDA

Battlefield Air Interdiction
Battle Damage Assessment

C4I
CAS
CASCOM
CCD
CEM
CHATS
CI
CIA
CINC
CNES
COMINT
COMSEC
COSAGE
COSPO

Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and Intelligence
Close Air Support
Combined Arms Support Command
Central Composite Design
Concept Evaluation Model
CI/HUMINT Automated Tool Set
Counter-intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Commander-in-Chief
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales
Communications Intelligence
Communications Security
Concepts and Analysis Agency's Combat Sample Generator
Community Open Source Program Office

DAMA
DEA
DIA
DIDS
DISN
DO
DoD
DoDIIS
DSCS
DSP

Demand Assigned Multiple Access
Drug Enforcement Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Defense Intelligence Dissemination System
Defense Information System Network
Directorate for Intelligence Operations
Department of Defense
DoD Intelligence Information System
Defense Satellite Communications System
Defense Support Program
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EA
ECM
EHF
ELINT
ENSCE
ESAMS

Electronic Attack
Electronic Countermeasures
Extremely-High Frequency
Electronic Intelligence
Enemy Situation Correlation Element
Enhanced Surface to Air Missile Simulation

FAX
FBI
FISINT
FLOT

Facsimile
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
Forward Line of Troops

GBCS
GBS
GCCS
GPS

Ground-Based Common Sensor
Global Broadcast Service
Global Command and Control System
Global Positioning System

HQ
HUMINT

Headquarters
Human Intelligence

ICBM
IDHS
IMINT
INF
INFOSEC
INMARSAT
INSCOM
IPB
INTELSAT
ISR

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Intelligence Data Handling Systems
Imagery Intelligence
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Information Security
International Maritime Satellite
Intelligence and Security Command
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
International Telecommunications Satellite
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JAOC
JC2WC
JDISS
JFACC
JFC
JFLCC
JFSOCC

Joint Air Operations Center
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
Joint Force Air Component Commander
Joint Force Commander
Joint Land Component Commander
Joint Force Special Ops Component Commander
Joint Intelligence Center
Joint Intelligence Support Element
Joint Service Imagery Processing System
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Joint Task Force
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System

JIC
JISE
JSIPS
J-STARS
JTF
JWICS
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MASINT
MCIA
ME
MILSATCOM
MOE
MOO
MSE
MSR

Measurement and Signature Intelligence
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
Middle East
Military Satellite Communications
Measure of Effectiveness
Measure of Outcome
Mean Square Error
Mean Square Regression

NAIC
NATO
NBC
NCA
NIMA
NIST
NMIC
NMJIC
NRO
NSA

National Air Intelligence Center
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
National Command Authority
National Imagery and Mapping Agency
National Intelligence Support Team
National Maritime Intelligence Center
National Military Joint Intelligence Center
National Reconnaissance Office
National Security Agency

OPSEC
OSINT

Operations Security
Open Source Intelligence

Pk

Probability of Kill

PvADGUNS
PvADINT
RAF
RCS
RECCE

Radar-Directed Gun System Simulation
Radar Intelligence
Royal Air Force
Radar Cross Section
Reconnaissance

S3I
SAAI
SAAW
SAM
SAR
SBIRS
SCI
SEAD
SHF
SIGINT
SLBM
SOF
SREC
SSE

System Simulation Solutions, Inc.
Information Superiority Branch (within AFSAA)
Wargaming Branch (within AFSAA)
Surface-to-Air Missile
Synthetic Aperture Radar
Space-Based Infrared System
Sensitive Compartmented Information
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Super-High Frequency
Signals Intelligence
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Special Operations Forces
Standoff Reconnaissance
Sum of Squares for Error
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SSR
START

Sum of Squares for Regression
Strategie Arms Reduction Treaty

TACS
TADIX-B
TBM
TDRSS
TECHINT
TEG
TELINT
TIBS
TLAM
TRAP

Tactical Air Control System
Tactical Data Information Exchange System-Broadcast
Tactical Ballistic Missile
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Technical Intelligence
Tactical Exploitation Group
Telemetry Intelligence
Tactical Information Broadcast System
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
Tactical Receive Equipment and Related Applications

UAV
UHF F/0
UHF
US
USMC
USN

Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle
Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on
Ultra-High Frequency
United States
United States Marine Corp
United States Navy
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Appendix B: Confidence Interval Summaries

90% Confidence Intervals for Total Red Equipment Killed
Mean/Median of Design Point 1 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Design Point i
Lower Bound -126.46 -196.72 -213.00 -1049.00 -1112.99 -1118.94 -1231.16
-70.00 -755.00 -906.94 -919.46 -1031.97
21.25
84.93
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 2 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
13
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-84.93 -174.02 -182.00 -1019.00 -1090.18 -1095.99 -1208.21
Lower Bound
-43.00 -737.00 -888.22 -900.87 -1013.39
40.09
126.46
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 3 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
12
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-40.09 -107.00 -967.00 -1026.65 -1032.65 -1144.87
-21.25
Lower Bound
-657.00 -817.81 -830.28 -942.79
174.02
34.00
196.72
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 4 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
1
Design Point i
-924.00 -918.00 -940.00 -1057.00
-34.00
43.00
70.00
Lower Bound
107.00 -647.00 -790.00 -796.00 -926.00
182.00
Upper Bound 213.00
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 5 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
6
7
8
Design Point i
Lower Bound 755.00 737.00 657.00 647.00 -261.00 -269.00 -372.00
-77.00
35.00
64.00
Upper Bound 1049.00 1019.00 967.00 924.00
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

150

Mean/Median of Design Point 6 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
7
8
Design Point i
-103.90 -216.11
-64.00
790.00
Lower Bound 1112.99 888.22 817.81
-27.09
85.43
261.00
918.00
Upper Bound 906.94 1090.18 1026.65
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 7 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
-203.21
-85.43
-35.00
796.00
830.28
Lower Bound 919.46 900.87
-21.52
103.90
269.00
Upper Bound 1118.94 1095.99 1032.65 940.00
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 8 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
27.09
77.00
Lower Bound 1031.97 1013.39 942.79 926.00
216.11
Upper Bound 1231.16 1208.21 1144.87 1057.00 372.00
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
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7
21.52
203.21
Yes

90% Confidence Intervals for Red Equipment Killed in Ground Battle
Mean/Median of Design Point 1 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Design Point i
158.00 -1118.00 -1175.43 -1027.64 -1051.32
161.00
-42.35
Lower Bound
298.00 286.00 -799.00 -976.10 -854.76 -867.75
157.15
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 2 - Mean/Median of Design Point I
8
13
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
106.00 -1176.00 -1230.91 -1082.73 -1106.63
Lower Bound -157.15 109.00
241.00 234.00 -876.00 -1035.42 -914.47 -927.24
42.35
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 3 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
4
5
6
7«
Design Point i
-1240.00
-1204.00
Lower Bound -298.00 -241.00 -51.00 -1344.00 -1346.00
41.00 -1091.00 -1225.00 -1089.00 -1110.00
Upper Bound -161.00 -109.00
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 4 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
5
6/8
Design Point i
Lower Bound -286.00 -234.00 -41.00 -1340.00 -1336.00 -1192.00 -1223.00
51.00 -1088.00 -1216.00 -1082.00 -1105.00
Upper Bound -158.00 -106.00
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 5 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
6/8
Design Point i
876.00 1091.00 1088.00 -293.00 -100.00 -135.00
Lower Bound 799.00
167.00
186.00
46.00
Upper Bound 1118.00 1176.00 1344.00 1340.00
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 6 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
/
Design Point i
50.54
Lower Bound 1175.43 1035.42 1225.00 1216.00 -46.00
218.59
Upper Bound 976.10 1230.91 1346.00 1336.00 293.00
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
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8
26.64
205.83
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 7 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
Lower Bound 854.76 914.47 1089.00 1082.00 1082.00 -218.59
-50.54
Upper Bound 1027.64 1082.73 1204.00 1192.00 -186.00
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

8
-92.51
55.85
No

Mean/Median of Design Point 8 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
927.24 1110.00 1105.00 -167.00 -205.83
Lower Bound 867.75
-26.64
Upper Bound 1051.32 1106.63 1240.00 1223.00 135.00
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

7
-55.85
92.51
No
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90% Confidence Intervals for Red Equipment Killed by Air Missions
Mean/Median of Design Point 1 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
2
3
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-145.34 -251.09
12.03
10.68
Lower Bound -154.32 -397.94 -426.21
-142.07
-33.02
115.86
-47.35 -295.33 -307.06 122.91
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 2 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
8
13
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-144.87
117.21
-39.29
-291.20 -320.52 118.15
47.35
Lower Bound
-46.63
210.99
62.59
154.32 -200.40 -211.08 218.45
Upper Bound
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 3 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
208.85
365.60
366.33
200.40
-72.60
Lower Bound 295.33
306.05
454.20
32.60
461.87
Upper Bound 397.94 291.20
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Significant?
Yes

8
103.40
196.70
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 4 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
5
6
7
Design Point i
220.11
377.47
376.05
-32.60
Lower Bound 307.06 211.08
483.75
334.79
490.73
320.52
72.60
Upper Bound 426.21
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Significant?

8
114.29
225.81
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 5 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
6
7
8
Design Point i
-209.68 -315.33
-53.35
Lower Bound -122.91 -218.45 -461.87 -490.73
-103.62 -212.77
44.95
-12.03 -118.15 -366.33 -377.47
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Mean/Median of Design Point 6 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
7
8
Design Point i
-202.41
-307.95
-44.95
-483.75
-454.20
-210.99
-10.68
Lower Bound
-102.49 -211.75
53.35
Upper Bound -115.86 -117.21 -365.60 -376.05
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
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Mean/Median of Design Point 7 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
8
Design Point i
102.49 -159.46
33.02
-62.59 -306.05 -334.79 103.62
Lower Bound
-55.34
202.41
209.68
145.34
-208.85 -220.11
39.29
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Significant?
Yes
Mean/Median of Design Point 8 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
211.75
-225.81
212.77
-196.70
142.07
46.63
Lower Bound
307.95
144.87 -103.40 -114.29 315.33
Upper Bound 251.09
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
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7
55.34
159.46
Yes

90% Confidence Intervals for Air Loss Exchange Ratio
Mean/Median of Design Point 1 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
2
3
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.44
-0.47
-0.15
-0.03
-0.09
-0.48
Lower Bound
0.16
-0.22
-0.30
-0.26
0.09
0.12
Upper Bound
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Significant?

8
-0.38
-0.16
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 2 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
13
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.48
-0.19
-0.10
-0.12
-0.51
-0.51
Lower Bound
-0.21
-0.24
0.06
0.18
-0.32
0.09
Upper Bound
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.40
-0.18
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 3 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.04
0.24
0.35
0.32
-0.08
0.30
Lower Bound
0.54
0.17
0.12
0.47
0.51
0.48
Upper Bound
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Significant?

8
0.02
0.22
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 4 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
1
2
3
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.10
0.20
0.28
0.24
-0.12
0.26
Lower Bound
0.17
0.55
0.08
0.45
0.47
0.51
Upper Bound
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.02
0.21
No

Mean/Median of Design Point 5 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
6
7
Design Point i
-0.02
-0.40
-0.45
-0.06
-0.47
-0.09
Lower Bound
0.24
-0.17
-0.24
-0.20
0.19
0.15
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Significant?

8
-0.33
-0.12
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 6 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
7
Design Point i
-0.52
-0.24
-0.55
-0.54
-0.18
0.03
Lower Bound
-0.24
0.02
-0.35
-0.28
0.10
-0.16
Upper Bound
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Significant?
No

8
-0.44
-0.22
Yes
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Mean/Median of Design Point 7 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Lower Bound
0.22
0.21
-0.17
-0.17
0.17
0.24
0.44
Upper Bound
0.48
0.04
0.10
0.40
0.52
Significant?
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

8
-0.05
0.16
No

Mean/Median of Design Point 8 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Lower Bound
0.16
0.18
-0.22
-0.21
0.12
0.22
Upper Bound
0.38
0.40
-0.02
0.02
0.33
0.44
Significant?
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

7
-0.16
0.05
No
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90% Confidence Intervals for Percentage of Red Strategic Targets Killed
Mean/Median of Design Point 1 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
2
3
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.02
-0.12
-0.14
-0.16
-0.15
-0.23
Lower Bound
-0.12
-0.12
0.01
-0.08
-0.09
-0.20
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.23
-0.21
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 2 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
13
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.12
-0.14
-0.15
-0.15
-0.23
Lower Bound
-0.01
-0.12
0.02
-0.07
-0.08
-0.11
-0.19
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.23
-0.20
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 3 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
4
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.06
-0.06
-0.13
Lower Bound
0.08
0.07
-0.05
-0.02
0.12
0.12
0.02
0.01
-0.08
Upper Bound
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Yes

8
-0.14
-0.08
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 4 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
5
6
7
Design Point i
-0.12
-0.02
-0.05
-0.05
Lower Bound
0.09
0.08
0.02
0.14
0.14
0.05
0.00
-0.06
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Significant?

8
-0.13
-0.07
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 5 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
6
7
Design Point i
-0.02
-0.02
-0.10
-0.01
0.12
0.11
Lower Bound
0.02
-0.05
0.06
0.05
0.16
0.15
Upper Bound
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.11
-0.06
Yes

Mean/Median of Design Point 6 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
7
Design Point i
-0.02
-0.09
0.12
0.02
0.00
0.15
Lower Bound
0.02
-0.06
0.06
0.05
0.12
0.15
Upper Bound
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

8
-0.10
-0.06
Yes
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Mean/Median of Design Point 7 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.19
0.08
0.20
Lower Bound
0.09
0.12
0.10
0.23
0.13
0.23
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?
Yes

8
-0.02
0.01
No

Mean/Median of Design Point 8 - Mean/Median of Design Point i
12
3
4
5
6
Design Point i
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.20
0.08
0.21
Lower Bound
0.10
0.13
0.11
0.14
0.23
0.23
Upper Bound
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Significant?

7
-0.01
0.02
No
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